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‘Freely have I received,’ Martin Luther claimed in the sixteenth century, ‘freely I have
given, and I want nothing in return’. Those days are long gone and in the present-day
knowledge economy the intellectual property regime plays a similar role as that of
the land property regime in Luther’s time. Millennia of conflict over that land property
regime, the associated rents, and the role it plays in determining the fate of countries
have told us how important it is to have a regime in place that gets the incentives
right. The same applies to the intellectual property regime, only on a larger scale: its
features and quality are essential determinants of the pace of innovation and the
distribution of its benefits both within and across countries.   
It is of therefore hardly surprising that patents have in recent years been the subject
of fierce controversy. From the Trade-related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) of
the Uruguay round to the patentability of living organisms and of software (not to
mention the exchange of music and movies via the Internet) numerous disputes have
drawn attention to the delicate trade-offs involved in the public granting of property
rights over discoveries or inventions. But most of these debates have focused on the
trees and missed the wood. There has been much less discussion about the overall
performance of the patent regime, the consistency of rules across countries and
global governance questions concerning international cooperation among patent
offices, though these are of major importance for competitiveness and growth.
These matters are the focus of Bruno van Pottelsberghe’s analysis. He first addresses
a specific European issue, and brings bad news: in spite of the supposed ending of
the linguistic dispute that for decades prevented its rationalisation, the European
patent system is still far from satisfactory. Forget the fact that only 15 of the 35
members of the European Patent Convention have signed the London Agreement on
translation requirements. Even in these countries, patents are still at least three
times more expensive than in the US or Japan. Fragmentation across European
countries, and the ultimate power of countries over patent validity decisions, further-
more results in legal uncertainty and unevenness in the quality of the patents  that
are enforced.vi
LOST PROPERTY FOREWORD
There is room for discussion on the scope, the breadth and the duration of patents.
But a costly and fragmented system that grants national property rights of dubious
quality and uncertain solidity is an unwarranted tax on innovation that is detrimen-
tal to both entrepreneurs and consumers. Van Pottelsberghe makes a number of sim-
ple proposals to improve upon the current situation in Europe, such as the
Community patent, a centralised litigation system, reforms in the governance of the
European Patent Office and an SME status. These should be at the top of the list for
policymakers looking for ways to spur an innovation-based recovery and encourage
research in Europe. 
Van Pottelsberghe’s second topic is what he calls global patent warming and what
could equally be called inflation. Here again, issues are first order and numbers speak
volumes: in the US, Europe and Japan combined, about one million patents are filed
each year. There is overwhelming evidence that this ballooning of patenting activity
does not reflect an increase in innovation activity but rather a deterioration in the
quality of patents that results from strategic use of patenting, especially in the US.
The consequences are considerable delays and an inevitable deterioration of the
quality of the examination process. Here again, this is strongly detrimental to innova-
tion and to consumers.
Bruno van Pottelsberghe is doubtful that proposals under consideration (essentially
a sort of mutual recognition, trials of which have started) are adequate responses to
the problem. Rather, he favours an ambitious Global Patent Standard that would
address the quality problems rather than merely sharing costs among patent offices.     
Here again the agenda for policymakers is straightforward. They cannot afford to let
deliberate mass spamming make an essential tenet of the global intellectual
property regime collapse. Action is required – and to outline a streamlined, more
quality-oriented international system would after all be a good way to signal the
intention to lay the foundations of post-crisis growth. 
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Director, Bruegel
Brussels, June 2009Executive summary
The European patent system faces two broad challenges: a European one and a global
one. 
Within Europe the key challenge is fragmentation of the patent system, where
national patent offices and jurisdictions have the ultimate power to grant or invali-
date patents, leading to different results across countries and frequently to the oppo-
site result to that arrived at by the centralised procedure performed by the EPO
(European Patent Office).
The consequences of this fragmentation are numerous:
• Prohibitive cost (mainly due to translation costs and national renewal fees);
• High uncertainty, (due to multiple litigation costs and differing legal systems);
• A quality drop (due to shortcuts to grant via parallel national applications). 
In other words, the European patent system and the work of the EPO are currently
being undermined by the high degree of patent fragmentation in Europe. 
The global challenge is related to the explosion in patent applications worldwide,
which is causing backlogs at patent offices. While patent applications have been
growing in number fast at most patent offices, the backlog issue is first and foremost
an American problem – the US has a much greater backlog than Europe. The major
consequences of these backlogs are more uncertainty on the market due to several
hundred thousand patents pending for lengthy periods and a drop in quality, in both
patent applications and in patents granted.
We submit that the ultimate cause of the explosion in the number of patents is relat-
ed to the design of patent systems by policymakers. In the US, a relatively low-quali-
ty examination process is evidenced by:
• A very high patent grant rate;• High turnover of employees (due in part to inadequate incentives);
• Lack of transparency and the lack of an opposition process for third parties;
• A very heavy workload per examiner.
These organisational problems, coupled with relatively low fees and few restrictions
on patentable subject matter, have led to a high and ever-growing propensity to
patent which does not correlate with any indicator of economic performance.
Major patent offices in the world have recently started negotiating, or have entered
into, work-sharing agreements and/or mutual recognition arrangements, given that a
proportion of patents are filed simultaneously at several patent offices. The solution
put forward by the US and Japan (they were the first to enter into such bilateral
agreements) in order to speed up examination and reduce backlogs takes the form of
so-called patent prosecution highways (PPHs): if a search or examination report has
been carried out by office A, office B must use it and deal with the patent using an
accelerated procedure. But it follows from our analysis that PPHs might harm the
patent system, because a ‘speed’ condition is attached to treatment of a foreign
report, whereas no ‘common’ patent quality conditions have been agreed upon by the
main patent offices.
Recommendations are advanced to solve the European internal fragmentation chal-
lenge and the global backlog challenge. The package of suggested measures to com-
bat fragmentation include: 
• Creating the Community patent and centralised European litigation system;
• A sound fee policy;
• The creation of an SME status;
• Improved EPO governance .
Regarding global cooperation, we argue that convergence in global patent standards
must occur before mutual recognition arrangements are put in place. Convergence
should occur in the three key dimensions of a patent system:
• Access to information;
• Structural changes in the process;
• The human factor (total resources for examiners).
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Why are patents important?
A patent is a legal title granting its holder the right to prevent third parties from com-
mercially exploiting an invention without prior authorisation. In other words, a patent
is a government-sanctioned monopoly. It is normally valid for a maximum period of
20 years from the date of application. Patent applications must generally satisfy two
key, cumulative grant conditions: novelty relative to state of the art; and inventive
step, or non-obviousness to a person normally skilled in the art. In Europe, more than
60 percent of patent applications filed with the European Patent Organisation (EPO)
are granted, of which it is generally estimated that between two and ten percent are
commercially successful.
The public policy rationale for patents is that they help to stimulate innovation, con-
tribute to a broad dissemination of knowledge and hence promote sustainable
growth. True, patents involve protecting monopolies, which competition authorities
keep a keen eye on for abuse of dominant position, but without them imitators could
immediately deprive the inventor of the benefits of his invention and private innova-
tion would thus be discouraged. Governments in effect take the calculated risk that,
on balance, the ‘carrot’ of patent protection will produce a net economic gain for their
economies. Clearly, the bigger the jurisdiction a given patent is granted for, the
greater the potential gain for both the patent holder and for society. 
What are the trade-offs in designing a patent system?
There are a number of general trade-offs in designing any patent system. An impor-
tant one concerns the length of patent protection. The longer the period during which
an invention is protected, the greater the spur to innovation. However, lengthy patent
protection also limits the spread of new and useful products or processes, and makes
them more expensive. It is clear therefore that the public policy aim of stimulating
innovation must be weighed against the deadweight loss caused by lack of competi-
tion. When inventions have an important role for public policy, such as vaccines forpublic health, governments may choose to limit the length of protection and make the
patented drug more affordable.
For business, the key features of any patent system are legal certainty and reason-
able cost. Ideally, a company – especially a cash-strapped SME – would always be
able to apply for a ‘one-stop-shop’ patent for any given jurisdiction where protection
is sought: national, European, global. With the exception of purely national patents
with no protection beyond the immediate border, there is no one-stop-shop at pres-
ent. Conversely, the greater the cost of acquiring a patent – especially where the bill
is bloated by duplicate administrative fees and translation charges which add no
value to the patent – the less attractive the system becomes, especially for SMEs. 
For governments, the public policy imperatives of a patent regime should be attain-
able in a way which provides proper incentives for business to innovate – but this is
not always the case. Indeed, this matter can be a politically fraught one where, for
example, national patent offices stand to lose revenue to a patent office with supra-
national reach, or where governments are unwilling or unable to devote adequate
resources to processing patent applications. 
Patent fragmentation
In enforcement terms, there is no such thing as a global, a European or a Community
patent. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) oversees a Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT), first concluded in 1970, under which companies may file a
single international application for protection in virtually every jurisdiction in the
world. An international search is carried out, after which a report and an opinion on
patentability are issued. But thereafter the company must still apply separately and
individually to each jurisdiction where patent protection is required. True, the
international search and opinion might reduce the search-related workload of
national patent offices subsequently examining the application, but there is no one-
stop-shop and no global patent. 
Unlike the WIPO system, the European Patent Office does grant a European patent, or
more accurately a ‘pre-patent’. The EPO was set up under the 1978 European Patent
Convention (EPC), which now counts 35 member countries (and includes the EU27).
However, a European patent granted by the EPO only provides protection once con-
verted into a national patent in one or more of the EPC signatory countries.  There is
no European ‘one-stop-shop’, and for the EU27 with its single market there is no
single Community patent ultimately actionable in the European Court of Justice.
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LOST PROPERTY INTRODUCTIONThe number, geographical origin, and chosen patenting route of filings that occurred
in 2007 in five major patent offices are presented in Table 1. The largest patent
offices in terms of the number of patent applications filed are the USPTO and the JPO
(Japan), followed by China (SIPO), South Korea (KIPO) and the EPO. The EPO figure is
relatively small because it is essentially composed of second filings of ‘priority’ (ini-
tial) filings at the national patent offices of the individual European countries, where-
as all other patent offices also include domestic priority filings.
Table 1: The five busiest patent offices, 2007
Data source: Trilateral statistical report, 2008, and the WIPO 2008 annual report; PCT: Patent Cooperation
Treaty; EPC: European Patent Convention; SIPO: Chinese Patent Office; KIPO: South Korean Patent Office.
Since patent law is a branch of the law of property, it is perhaps unsurprising that any
national jurisdiction is loath to cede patent powers to supranational courts. But the
opportunity cost of such reluctance is considerable. Fragmentation of patent
systems means less innovatory activity, especially from young, small, innovative
companies , and hence lower economic growth (eg Veugelers, 2009). For Europe in
particular, with a single market and supranational market surveillance, fragmenta-
tion of patent systems is clearly a major anomaly and inimical to Europe’s innovation
and growth.
Global patent warming 
Patent systems would ideally be legally predictable and affordable for business,
especially for SMEs. But a further challenge confronts patent offices: ‘global patent
5
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Applications (000s) EPO JPO USPTO SIPO KIPO
Total patent applications  140.8 396.3 456.2 245.2 172.5
Applications received acting as a PCT
international patent receiving office
26.1 26.9 54.6 5.4 7.1
International PCT searches performed 75.4 25.9 30.5
Origin of total applications
% US 25% 6% 52%
% EPC 49% 7% 14%
% Japan 16% 84% 17%
% Rest of world 10% 3% 16%
% Domestic 49% 84% 52% 58% 76%
% PCT 55% 12% 11% 23% 16%warming’
1. Coined by an official of the EPO, this term has been used to describe the
growing backlog of pending patent applications in all major patent offices. Owing to
the increase in the relative importance of intellectual capital in a globalising world,
and perhaps also as a result of an increase in ‘speculative’ or ‘tactical’ patent
applications by businesses under competitive pressure, the total volume of patent
applications worldwide has risen steeply in recent years (see Figure 6). However, the
resources of patent offices have not kept step with this rise. This patent inflation is
particularly noteworthy in the case of the US patent office. 
Faced with such backlogs, patent offices have a number of options: carry on as today
and watch the backlogs grow; trade search quality for speed in order to reduce the
backlog; or offload processing of patent applications to other offices and agree on
mutual recognition of search findings. None of these choices are ideal. Offloading
patent processing to other patent offices is perhaps the least unattractive. But work-
sharing agreements where one of the parties to the agreement has inflationary
behaviour, as is the case for the US, necessarily results in the ‘export’ of inflation to
the other parties, especially to Europe.
Looking at the above issues facing patent systems, we have sought to boil them
down to two key challenges for Europe:
• Fragmentation: the continued need for multiple patent applications implies addi-
tional cost for business (and ultimately for governments), and overlapping juris-
diction between the European and national levels results in legal uncertainty,
potentially yet more costs and de facto lower quality.
• Global patent warming: Europe has agreed with the US and others to share work on
processing patent applications, this arrangement may not be in Europe’s interest
given the particularly strong US patent inflation. 
The two above challenges are linked. As long as the European patent system is frag-
mented and costly, there is little incentive for companies to switch from applying for
patents through the US system to applying through the European system, thereby
providing relief for US patent inflation. It is a vicious circle.           
We examine both of the above challenges in detail using new and revealing evidence
in the upcoming chapters. We start with the issue of European patent fragmentation
in chapter 2, then move to global patent warming in chapter 3. We conclude and make
concrete policy recommendations in chapter 4.
6 6
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1. See ‘Urgent call to ease patent backlogs’, IP Review Online, 16 September 2008.2. The European patent system:
‘a little local difficulty’
“Member states cannot claim that R&D and innovation are keys for eco-
nomic growth and at the same time block progress on the patent agenda.”
Ernest-Antoine Sellière, President of Business Europe,
quoted in ‘Intellectual property’, 16 April 2007, Economist Intelligence Unit
Figure 1: A simplified picture of the European patent system
Figure 1 illustrates the fragmentation of the European patent system in a simplified
way. Companies wanting to protect their invention in Europe generally start with a
priority (initial) filing at their national patent office (NPO, the orange circle). From the
Commercial exploitation?
Keep secret?
Patent it?
NPO
NPO 1
NPO 2
NPO..
NPO..
NPO35
EPO
grants
Firm Z
creates a new invention...
Yes
No
Yes
...and decides to
file a patent... ...then at the EPO
...if granted it must be validated, translated and
renewed in the relevant member statespriority date, the applicant has one year to file an application before the EPO (or 32
months if following the PCT ‘beyond-Europe extension’ route). The EPO then carries
out the search (check for novelty) and the substantive examination (check for inven-
tive step) and may grant the patent. If the patent is granted, it can only be enforced
in those member states of the EPC where the patent has subsequently been validat-
ed and translated, involving additional fees and costs. Each year the owner must pay
renewal fees in every country where protection is to be prolonged.
On average, a patent granted by the EPO is validated in 5-6 countries (van
Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck, 2008). In other words, once granted, a European
patent essentially becomes a bundle of national rights. In case of litigation, national
jurisdictions have the power to invalidate patent rights, even where the EPO has
granted the patent, and to uphold a patent where the EPO has invalidated it.
This is a paradoxical situation: we have EU-wide competition policy but national
patent  oversight. The European Union’s competition authority has jurisdiction
throughout the European market but the countervailing leverage provided by intellec-
tual property policy is ultimately run at the national level in each EU member state.
An obvious practical drawback of this asymmetry is that illicit parallel trade in patent-
ed goods is hard to prevent. It is relatively easy for patent imitators to import goods
into the European Union through a country where the patent has not been enforced,
and then to distribute them with impunity throughout the EU, including in the
countries where the patent is enforced. As a result, companies have to deploy
resources to protect themselves against potential patent infringers, a function per-
formed pre-single market partly by border controls. Even if an infringer is identified in
one of the national markets of the EU, the patent holder must subsequently rely on
the legal system of the state in which the infringement takes place in order to uphold
his or her rights.
This fragmentation of the European patent system leads to three ‘incongruities’
which radically reduce its effectiveness:
1 Prohibitive cost of patenting
2 Legal uncertainty over jurisdiction
3 Inconsistent patent quality 
The three key incongruities are analysed in the following subsections.
LOST PROPERTY THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM2.1 Prohibitive cost
The European patent system is unnecessarily expensive. As mentioned, once grant-
ed, the European patent must be validated in each member country of the EPC where
protection is required. This step requires the filing of a translated document and the
payment of validation fees in each of the relevant EPC countries. Furthermore, annual
renewal fees are payable on a country-by-country basis for up to a total of 20 years
from the priority date. One recent initiative within the EPC legal framework designed
to simplify the procedure and make it less expensive is the so-called London
Agreement (LA) on translation requirements. van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008)
have simulated the consequences that the LA may have on the cost of patenting in
Europe (Figure 2). 
But the London Agreement has only partially solved the translation problem. The
trimmed-down translation requirements only apply in the 15 signatory member
states of the LA, not in all the EPC signatories
2. States which have an official language
in common with one of the official languages of the EPO agree to dispense completely
with translation. But other states may require a translation of the claims into their
own language, and may require the description of the invention to be translated into
a language of the EPO. In case of litigation, a full translation of the European patent
into the language of the state in which the alleged infringement took place is
required. The 20 countries which have not signed the LA may still require translation
of the whole patent into their own language(s).
Figure 2, overleaf, summarises the detailed costs of a patent filing at the EPO. The
simulation methodology is based on van Pottelsberghe and François (2009). The
white area represents the cumulated fees (filing, search and examination fees at the
EPO), the shaded area represents the translation costs, and the dark area the valida-
tion fees at national patent offices. The LA appears, at first glance, to be a major step
forward, bringing cost reductions of 21 percent if all member states are targeted and
a reduction of 29 percent if the patent is validated in ‘only’ six countries. The last col-
umn illustrates a 62 percent cost reduction resulting from a purely hypothetical rat-
ification of the LA by all EPC member states, and where all countries are targeted for
protection, and can thus be disregarded for practical purposes.
9
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2. As of May 2008 the LA ratification process was initiated in Belgium, it was not yet ratified in early 2009. Since
Belgium shares a common language with the EPO its inclusion or not in the simulation would have very little
effect on the results. The simulations include Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Croatia, Iceland, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, The Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.Figure 2: Relative cost savings due to the London Agreement, May 2008
The cost savings are simulated for three configurations: before the LA, after the LA in its current format,
with 15 member countries (LA15); and (LA34), the dummy whereby all EPC contracting states have
ratified the London Agreement. EPO3 means protection in France, Germany and the UK. EPO6 (or 13)
means protection in the 6 (or 13) most frequently targeted countries. EPO-34 includes all EPC member
states as of end 2008.
Source: Adapted from van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008)
Bottom line? The London Agreement has reduced costs somewhat, but the cumulat-
ed translation costs and renewal fees which occur after the grant of a patent by the
EPO are still relatively very high and are clearly still a burden on applicants. This is
illustrated in Figure 3, which displays the annual cumulated expenditure associated
with a patent granted by the EPO and then protected in six or 13 countries. During the
search and examination process at the EPO the cumulated fees increase from about
€1800 to €5000 over a period of five to six years. These fees include EPO search fees,
EPO examination fees and EPO renewal fees. Once the patent is granted, the appli-
cant must pay translation costs and renewal fees to NPOs in each target country. An
additional €5-12,000 (for six or 13 countries targeted for validation, respectively) is
payable by the applicant as a result of translations alone. 
There is growing evidence that the fee burden in Europe is affecting the behaviour of
applicants. Indeed, deliberately delaying the grant date in order to avoid translation
costs and renewal fees appears to be common practice among applicants. The EPO6
and EPO13 curves in Figure 3 go some way to explaining the rationale behind such
10
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claims and unclear descriptions inevitably leads to multiple contacts between the
patent office and the applicant, and hence delays the grant date and the triggering of
costs
3.
Figure 3: When do patent costs kick in?
Source: Own calculations, EPO fee structure as of May 2008 and renewal fees at national patent offices.
Translation costs, which occur after the grant of the patent, are taken from van Pottelsberghe and Mejer
(2008) and take into account the cost reduction brought about by the London Agreement. EPO6 stands
for validation in 6 EPC countries, EPO13 stands for validation in 13 EPC countries. Costs in €1000.
How do Europe’s patenting costs compare with those applicable elsewhere in the
world? The consequence of European fragmentation is striking: translation costs and
national renewal fees make the European system at least four times more expensive
than the US, Chinese, Japanese or South Korean systems. 
The cumulated costs of the major patent offices in the world are shown in Figure 4.
Despite the reduction in translation costs brought about by the London Agreement, a
11
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3. See the typology put forward by Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe (2007) for a qualitative description of draft-
ing styles and interaction modes with the EPO which aim at delaying the grant date. For evidence about the
impact of the fee structure on the behaviour of applicants, see Archontopoulos et al. (2007), de Rassenfosse and
van Pottelsberghe (2007, 2008, 2009) and Harhoff et al. (2007, 2008). Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe
(2007) illustrate the relationship between the number of claims and the probability of a communication from the
examiner to the patent owner, which in turn creates one additional year of delay.
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Publication date,
examination fees
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Grant at the EPO
Renewal feesEuropean patent remains much more expensive than anywhere else in the world. The
cumulated translation and procedural costs (essentially search and examination
fees) total about 17,000 USD PPPs if 13 countries are targeted and 10,000 USD PPPs
with six countries. In all other large patent offices the procedural costs are about five
times lower, and fluctuate around 2000 USD PPPs (cf. the white areas in Figure 4). If
renewal fees for a ten-year protection period are included in the cumulated costs, the
cost of a European patent fluctuates between 18,000 and 33,000 USD PPPs, depend-
ing on the geographical scope of protection. This is to be compared with about 5,000
USD PPPs or less in the USPTO and in all other patent offices. In other words, ten years’
protection in the US or anywhere else in the world costs at least three times less than
ten years’ protection in the European patent system. As discussed in the subsequent
chapters, higher examination fees could be welcome if they correlate with a high
quality of the examination process; but this is clearly not the case for translation
costs and renewal fees.
Figure 4. International comparison of cumulated patent costs, 2008 (in USD PPPs)
Source: van Pottelsberghe and Mejer (2008), KIPO is the national patent office of South Korea, SIPO for
China, JPO for Japan, BR-PO for Brazil, IN-PO for India, AU-PO for Australia, CIPO for Canada. 
Let us account for bias in this ranking (van Pottelsberghe and François, 2009). First,
patent size (in term of the average number of claims included in a patent) varies
substantially across regions. For instance, Japanese patents include far fewer claims
per patent (about 9.5) than the average US patent (about 23). The second source of
12
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bias is related to the size of the markets covered by the patent offices. If two
countries have similar patenting costs but one has a larger population, the relative
cost (per market unit) will logically be lower in this larger country. 
The simultaneous correction for the two sources of bias may be performed with the
3C-index (the cost per claim per capita). Despite the savings on translation costs
thanks to the LA, the relative cost of a European patent validated in six (thirteen)
countries is still at least five (seven) times higher than in the US. Focusing on the
largest patent offices in countries with similar levels of economic development
(Europe, Japan, South Korea and the US), a demand curve would show high demand
for patents in the least expensive patent offices (the USPTO) and lower demand in
regions where the relative patenting costs are higher (Europe, South Korea). Recent
simulations show that a single EU Community patent (EU27) would reduce patenting
costs in Europe by about 60 percent
4. The fee policy issue will be addressed in sub-
sequent chapters, as it correlates with the quality or rigour of the grant process.
2.2 High legal uncertainty
The very purpose of a patent is to reduce uncertainty by providing monopolistic
power to the inventor. This privilege may be challenged at the EPO through a
centralised opposition process, or in national courts. But this twin-track challenge
leads to a high degree of legal uncertainty. As mentioned, even if the EPO decides to
uphold a European patent, opponents of the patent remain free to mount further
validity challenges before national courts, which have the power to pass judgment on
patent matters within their respective jurisdictions. By the same token, where the
EPO refuses a patent application, a national patent office may still grant a similar
parallel application for its own territory.
It is relatively affordable to file an opposition before the EPO, as the cost varies
between €6000 and €50,000 (including patent attorneys’ fees). But it may not be
so affordable to conduct litigation in the individual EPO member countries. Table 2
presents the costs of patent litigation in four European jurisdictions and in the US.
The starting point for the cost estimates in Table 2 is litigation for an average patent
with a relatively small market value (with an amount in dispute of about €1 million).
The cost of litigation obviously increases with the amount at stake and with the
LOST PROPERTY THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM
4. Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2009) show that the Community patent would not only drive down relative
patenting costs in Europe by 60 percent but would also contribute to increase the renewal fee receipts of national
patent offices.14
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complexity of the case. For example, in Germany the cost of litigation can be as high
as €2 million where €10 million are at stake (IP Campenhausen, 2004), whereas in
the US litigation costs may attain about €2.5 million if the amount at stake is higher
than €16 million (Bessen and Meurer, 2006). 
Table 2: Patent litigation costs and occurrence in four EPC Member states and the US
(€000)
* Estimates apply to a patent with an amount in dispute of about €1 million. For Germany, numbers are
given for both validity and infringement cases (separate courts). Cf. Table A.4 in the Appendix of Mejer
and van Pottelsberghe (2008). Litigation costs are adapted from EPO Doc. WPL/11/05 Rev. 1, 16
February 2006; AIPLA (2005), and Bessen and Meurer (2006). 
Source: Mejer and van Pottelsberghe (2009)
As Table 2 shows, litigation costs vary significantly across jurisdictions. The United
Kingdom is by far the most expensive jurisdiction among EPC member countries.
Costs in the UK are nearly as high as costs in the other three jurisdictions put togeth-
er. Litigation costs in France, Germany and the Netherlands are similar. However, in
case of multiple parallel litigations across jurisdictions, cumulated costs vary from
€310,000 before the four courts of first instance up to €3.6 million when taking
account of the cost of appeal at second instance. The cost of multiple litigation is
thus prohibitive in Europe, especially for individuals and SMEs, and can be more than
twice as high as in the United States. Harhoff (2009) shows that by the year 2013
there might be 200 to 430 cases of multiple litigation in Europe. A single patent court
in Europe would produce savings of €148 to €289 million for business.
The US system, covering a market of 300 million inhabitants, has four to six times
more patents in force than the largest European economies, which are individually at
least three times smaller. The countries with the largest number of patents should
logically have a larger amount  of litigation. However, the share of litigation in the total
number of patents (an indicator of the probability of litigation) varies substantially
across countries. Germany is the country with the cheapest and arguably the best-
known judicial system for patent-related litigations within Europe. Figure 5 shows the
Germany France The
Netherlands
United
Kingdom
Cumulative
4EPC
United
States
Litigation cost*
1st instance 50 to 250 50 to 200 60 to 200 150 to 1,500 310 to 2,150 NA
2nd instance 90 to 190 40 to 150 40 to 150 150 to 1,000 320 to 1,490 NA
Total 140 to 440 90 to 350 100 to 350 300 to 2,500 630 to 3,640 42015
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position of the above five countries (four European and the US) along two dimen-
sions: the average cost of litigation per thousand capita on the horizontal axis and the
number of cases of litigation as a share of the total number of patents enforced in the
country on the vertical axis. A traditional non-linear demand curve seems to drive the
relationship. Among European countries, relatively inexpensive Germany has a great
deal of litigation and, at the other, the costly United Kingdom has little litigation.
Figure 5: A litigation demand curve for small market value patents, 2004
Note: For the EPO, instead of the total number of patents in force we take the total number of patents
granted in 2004. On average six percent of granted patents are subject to an opposition. European
patents are on average validated in 6 countries, therefore population size for the EPO is assumed to be
the sum of the population of these countries (about 300 million). In Germany the courts hearing
infringement and validity cases are separate. DE* indicates infringement cases in Germany and DE**
nullity (validity) cases. The litigation cost is calculated as the average total cost of proceedings at both
first and second instance. Source: Mejer and van Pottelsberghe (2009)
In the US, the relatively large market reduces to some extent the prohibitive costs
associated with patent litigation, hence the relatively high litigation rate. At the oppo-
site end of the scale is the United Kingdom, with the highest litigation costs per
capita and the lowest litigation rate. 
It could be argued that while Figure 5 provides a quantitative picture of the litigation
costs in different patent systems, it does not provide a comprehensive qualitative
picture of how patent systems actually work. Indeed, the quality of the examination
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process and other institutional differences are not reflected here at all
5. However, the
fact that the litigation/cost correlation holds good for the four European countries
supports somewhat the view that relative litigation costs do influence the propensity
to litigate.
But the legal uncertainty produced by the fragmented European patent system is
starkest in the ‘time paradoxes’ involved in the processing and enforcement of
patents. Within nine months of a decision by the EPO to grant a patent, third parties
may file an opposition to the patent (either for nullity or for amendments) at the EPO.
The EPO decision on an opposition case is – logically enough – supposed to apply in
all the countries where the patent is enforced. However, at the same time as the chal-
lenge at the EPO, the validity of a patent can also be challenged separately under the
legal rules of the individual countries in which the patent has been validated. What is
more, a national action for nullity may be brought immediately as of the date of vali-
dation of the patent by a national patent office, even if an opposition case is still
pending at the EPO. By the same token, the patent holder may sue potential
infringers in the relevant national court immediately as of the date of validation in
that country. Since it takes on average three years for the EPO to decide on an oppo-
sition case, a party may be accused of patent infringement and be required to pay
damages or even endure permanent injunction at national level even where the
patent is subsequently declared invalid by the EPO (cf. the four case studies devel-
oped by Mejer and van Pottelsberghe (2009) and briefly summarised in Appendix 5).
The legal reasoning of a national judge faced with this time paradox is instructive. In
May 2007, the UK Court of Appeal ruled that damages for patent infringements
awarded by a UK court are not required to be paid back even if the patent is subse-
quently declared invalid by the EPO.  In this ruling, Lord Justice Jacob justified his
decision by the need for certainty in business:
‘First and foremost, the defendant has had a full and fair opportunity of
attacking the validity of the patent in his own proceedings. Next there is a very
strong public interest in the finality of litigation.[...] It is much better that he
knows that the first litigation about validity is the time and place for him to get
his best case together – that he knows he will have no second chance’.
5. The five jurisdictions differ not only in terms of proceedings costs but also in terms of institutional design and
legal practice, such as procedural law, speed of proceedings, damage assessment or quality of rulings (Mejer and
van Pottelsberghe, 2009). For instance, with regard to the quality of proceedings, Germany has the highest
number of legally and technically qualified judges, against none in France and the Netherlands. 17
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What motivated Lord Justice Jacob in this case was not the question of which court
had jurisdiction, but how best to operate with an imperfect European patent system.
Here, the fact that his compromise might produce a manifestly unfair result does not
seem to influence his view:
‘I am not sorry to reach that conclusion, [...] It means that businessmen
in this country know that they can use the rather speedy court system here to
get a conclusion one way or the other’.[...] If the patent is revoked, the way is
cleared; if it is upheld and held infringed then compensation will be payable for
past acts. And an injunction will run unless there is a later revocation by the
EPO. Subject to that last point, the effect of all this is that one does not have to
wait to find out who has won until the slowest horse in the race gets there.’
‘Patent damages not refunded if EPO cancels patent’
(Out-law.com, 2007a)
This stance is not shared by judges in all EPC countries, nor even by all involved in the
UK patent system, and certainly not by the UK Trade Marks, Patents and Design
Federation:
‘We are concerned that current management emphasis appears to be
more on timely grant than on achieving the high standards of examination of
former years.’
TMPDF (2008, p. 3)
But the point here is not so much that a UK judge has taken a decision that is highly
pragmatic but potentially unfair to some parties to a patent dispute. The point is that
the European patent system allows and even encourages such legal uncertainty to
exist, threatening the credibility of the system, harming business and ultimately
detracting from the innovation, knowledge and growth benefits that governments
pursue.
2.3 Inconsistent patent quality
The incongruities mentioned in the previous section are the outcome of a dual
system in which the EPO grants patents centrally but where national patent offices
have the ultimate power to validate, invalidate and assess infringement proceedings
relevant to their own jurisdiction. But another source of inconsistency deserves
attention: the fact that national patent offices may grant a national patent even if apatent has not been applied for at the EPO, and indeed even if the same application
has been refused by the EPO. Procedurally, it is perfectly permissible to make simul-
taneous filings at one or several national patent offices and at the EPO. If an EPO
patent is granted, the patent owner simply proceeds with validation in the desired
member countries. If the EPO application is refused or amended, it is still possible for
the unsuccessful EPO applicant to rely on the patent(s) filed through the national
route(s). 
Interestingly, the aggregate number of patents granted by national patent offices in
2007 (more than 58,000 patents, see Table 3) is not far from the total number of
patents granted by the EPO the same year (about 55,000). So, purely national rights
are as important as EPO-granted rights. These figures confirm that 30 years after the
creation of the EPO, the national route is still important. 
Another measure of the importance of the national route may be gained by looking at
the share of foreign applications in the total number of patents granted by the
national patent offices of EPC member countries, (Table 3). Of the patents granted by
national patent offices, 25 percent (or 15,000) were granted to foreign applicants.
This share varies substantially but is significant in most countries. In Germany the
ratio of foreign applications is 27 percent, and about 20 percent for France and the
UK. These figures show that the parallel, non-EPC route is frequently used, especially
in the case of large national patent offices. Applicants clearly face no major disadvan-
tage in getting a patent granted in a selection of countries, even if the EPO has not
granted it beforehand.
It seems, then, that the granting process orchestrated by the EPO can be ‘bypassed’
if one or more applications are made directly to national patent offices. This practice
may have a number of explanations, some innocent (only interested in one or two
markets), some less so (a perception that some national offices are a ‘soft touch’ for
applications compared with the EPO). In any case, it is clear that the existence of twin
routes to the grant of a patent in Europe is not of a nature to foster Europe-wide con-
sistency of patent quality. This being the case, any initiative by EPO member
countries to agree upon mutual recognition of patent decisions would bear the risk of
further inconsistency in patent quality, a race to the bottom, and ultimately ‘qualita-
tive fragmentation’ of the European patent system.
18
LOST PROPERTY THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEMTable 3: Patents granted by national patent offices, 2007
Source: Adapted from EPO, CA/F 5/08 f, P.60.; own calculations.
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National patent
offices
Total
To foreign
applicants
Foreign (%)
Austria AT 1963 352 18
Bulgaria BG 259 176 68
Czech Republic CZ 1203 976 81
Denmark DK 223 72 32
Finland FI 921 305 33
France FR 12116 2362 19
Germany DE 17739 4762 27
Hungary HU 637 525 82
Italy IT 6469 545 8
Netherlands NL 2319 524 23
Romania RO 684 200 29
Slovakia SK 574 485 84
Spain ES 2667 342 13
Sweden SE 1287 238 18
Switzerland CH/LI 737 295 40
Turkey TR 629 332 53
United Kingdom GB 5930 1162 20
TOTAL EPC 58497 14666 253. Global patent warming
‘[EPO President] Alison Brimelow has warned that national patent offices
must avert 'global patent warming' by working closer together to ease backlogs.
The European Patent Office (EPO) president was speaking at the 41st World
Intellectual Property Congress. [...]  The term 'global patent warming' [...] was
first coined in July by one of the most senior EPO officials, controller Ciáran
McGinley, who wrote that incoming volumes per patent office were increasing
as a result of globalisation driven by trade and patent activity. He also pointed
out that the general pendency volume was increasing despite what was hap-
pening to pendency times in individual patent offices. “Woolly boundaries are
widespread,” he argued, “not just between granted patents but especially
among pending applications.”’
‘Urgent call to ease patent backlogs' (IP Review Online, 2008)
This quotation describes the current perception of so-called ‘global patent warming’
– severe processing backlogs –  in the world patent system by key policymakers and
hints at the solution they envisage: a global patent coordination package. The end of
2008 saw a number of agreements aiming at work-sharing and coordination of
approaches to patents. The USPTO had already signed two Patent Prosecution
Highways (PPH) agreements with Japan and the UK. In September 2008, the USPTO
and the EPO launched their own PPH agreement, whereby each patent office exploits
the work previously done by the other office and fast-tracks the patents in question.
The one-year trial between the USPTO and the EPO is scheduled to end on 29
September 2009
6. On 14 November in The Hague, the three offices (EPO, UK, US)
agreed to move forward on work-sharing and to support the recently initiated co-
operation of the five largest intellectual property offices. 
The objective of this chapter is to assess these global work-sharing packages in the
light of recent developments in patenting in major patent offices. A key driver of these
6. IP Review Online, ‘US Strengthens global patent ties’, 3 October 2008.bilateral agreements is the backlog in processing patent applications. We address the
following questions:
• To what extent is ‘global patent warming’ actually taking place and what are its
consequences?
• If ‘global patent warming’ exists, what has caused it?
• Is a global work-sharing package an appropriate solution, in particular for Europe?
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section presents the broad global trend
in the number and size of patent applications. The second section shows the poten-
tial consequences of these developments in terms of backlogs at the EPO, the USPTO
and JPO. The third section investigates the causes of these backlogs. The fourth sec-
tion argues that the current work-sharing packages (the PPHs) in reality seem to
constitute US ‘dumping’ of low quality patents.
3.1 The patent bubble
The patent bubble is characterised by a constant increase in the number and size of
patent applications. For the EPO, the year 2008 saw a record-breaking number of
patent filings, nearly 227,000, an increase of about 60 percent on 2000
7. Figure 6,
overleaf, shows that this is far from being an isolated issue. The USPTO was close to
the 460,000 applications threshold in 2007, more than twice the number of patent
applications as at the EPO (218,000 in 2007) and increasing fast. Japan seems to
be stabilising at around 400,000 applications per year. The 2008  crisis will probably
have a similar effect to the 1995 downturn in the US, with a sharp drop in
applications, but the previous trend will no doubt return thereafter.
This accelerating trend in the number of patent filings at the EPO is attributable to
several factors (cf. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2007):
• The success of the EPC, which has grown from fewer than 10 countries in the late
1970s to 35 countries as of April 2009, representing about 600 million
inhabitants;
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7. These figures include Euro-Direct applications (direct filings at the EPO) and PCT international filings, which can
be considered as options for future applications at the EPO, ie ‘PCT Regional Phase’. PCT international applications
must, however, be taken into account as they substantially increase the workload of EPO examiners, who must
provide a search report (checking for prior art) and a non-binding opinion on the patentability of the application.Figure 6. Total patent filings at the USPTO, JPO and EPO, 1980-2007 (000s)
Source: EPO, USPTO and JPO.
• Higher levels of research and development, fast-emerging technological fields (eg
nanotechnologies, biotechnologies), and fast-growing countries (eg China, with
more than 1,000 European applications per year, has become the fifth most active
non-European applicant country);
• New types of institutions entering the patent arena, eg universities (from less
than 0.5 percent of total applications in the early 1980s, academic patenting now
exceeds four percent with about 5,000 applications filed each year at the EPO)
8;
• New innovation management practices developed within the business sector, and
new filing strategies adopted by firms.
The above factors are not confined to Europe. The global level of R&D activity has also
grown fast, leading to more inventions and hence patent filings. From less than 300
billion (in constant 2000 USD PPPs) in the early 1980s, the annual level of R&D
expenditures in the OECD area increased to 700 billion in 2006. If countries such as
China, Russia, Israel and Singapore are also accounted for, an additional 120 billion
22
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8. The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 gave US universities greater incentives to commercialise technology: 'The act allowed
universities to patent the results of federally-funded research and license the resulting technology to business-
es and other entities' (Joint Economic Committee US Congress, 1999, p.31). European countries and Japan
adopted similar legislation during the 1990s. See Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe (2006), Schmoch (2004) and
van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) for recent empirical evidence. According to Mowery and Sampat (2004), this trend
is also observed for applications filed at the USPTO.must be added (as compared to 50 billion in 2000)
9. 
In addition to this intensification of research activity, there has been a growing
propensity worldwide to rely on the patent system. Institutions are not only more
likely to seek protection for a given invention, they are also protecting the invention
with more than one patent. The patent to researcher ratio in the OECD area has more
than tripled at the EPO, from 1.6 in 1980 to 5.1 patents per 100 researchers now. In
the US the ratio has not quite doubled but was already much higher than in Europe,
witnessing a strong propensity to protect intangible assets in the US. It has jumped
from about six patents per 100 researchers to more than 10 over the past three
decades
10. 
New innovation management practices, leading to more inventions and hence patent
applications, can be seen in a new division of labour whereby some firms specialise
in research activities and offer their research output to ‘producing’ firms. According to
Kortum and Lerner (1999) the observed jump in patenting in the 1990s reflects an
increase in US innovation spurred by changes in the management of research. A more
recent trend in innovation management is reflected in the so-called ‘open-innovation’
process (cf. Chesbrough, 2003) through which firms collaborate on innovative proj-
ects with other specialised firms in order to widen the scope of their knowledge base
and to speed up their research and market reach. Opening your doors and knowledge
base to others generally requires sound protection of your own intangible assets,
which partly explains the need to rely more frequently on the patent system
11. 
But increasing reliance on specific patenting strategies is the most important factor
underlying the increase in the observed propensity to patent. There is evidence  that
companies have tended to change their management practice from a ‘single-patent’
approach to a portfolio approach, which may be said to be based more on quantity
than quality. This practice may be attributable to tactics, well described in Arora et al.
(2002), designed to ‘reserve’ markets for technology. Glazier (2000) lists the
following specific corporate objectives
12 which may lie behind a new portfolio
approach to patents: 
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9. Data on R&D expenditure comes from the OECD-MSTI database.
10.Own calculations from patent series statistics and R&D expenditure (OECD, MSTI, 2008).
11.For instance, Peeters and van Pottelsberghe (2006) show that three key dimensions of innovation strategy influ-
ence the size of a firm’s patent portfolio: the relative importance of basic and applied research in total R&D activ-
ities, the product or process orientation of innovation efforts, and the extent to which firms enter into
collaborative R&D with other institutions. R&D collaboration is increasing, so there are more patent applications.
12.Cf. Teece (1993), Reitzig (2004b) and Guellec et al. (2007) for recent insights on patent strategies.• To ‘freeze’ a technology (to prevent access to a particular technology by other
actors);
• To guarantee its own freedom to operate and avoid potential litigation (safety
net);
• To be perceived as an important innovator on the market (communication
strategy);
• To enhance negotiating power for future access to the market and for potential
mergers;
• To avoid being ‘invented around’ (a thicket of patents is filed around a key
invention);
• To invent around the patents filed by other companies (to enter a protected area);
• To create a smoke screen (filing many applications in order to ‘hide’ one important
one);
• To generate additional revenues through the monetisation/licensing of patents.
A secondary objective of multiple patenting may consist of flooding patent offices
with similar applications in order to maximise the probability of getting ‘something’
granted
13. 
Such patent practices may prove incompatible with the original purpose and
functioning of patent systems: to be a mechanism designed to stimulate innovation.
They not only generate more patent applications than would normally be the case but
they may also deliberately build delays into the treatment of patents through vague
drafting and large numbers of pages and claims. Since the early 1980s the average
patent application size at the EPO has grown by more than 200 percent, from 10
claims per patent in 1980 to about 22 claims now. The average patent filed at the
USPTO contains 24 claims. In the 1980s, patents filed at the JPO had on average only
one claim, as against nine nowadays.
The surge in both the number and the size of patent applications has led to a near-
exponential evolution in the incoming workload of patent offices, as illustrated in
Figure 7.  The trend is particularly pronounced in the US. From just over one million
13.The content of the book ‘Patent Strategies for Business’, written by Glazier (2000), provides an interesting insight
into the snowball effect created by some advisors or patent attorneys. The third chapter of this book is called
‘Invent around your competitor’s patent (and the antidote) and other patent strategies’. The other strategies
include ‘how to submarine a picket fence’, and its ‘counter-attack strategy’. In a nutshell, this patent expert puts
forward practices or tactics that consist of filing more patents, with additional claims over time (through contin-
uation in parts), and reliance on submarine practices (applications hidden until they are granted). The side effect
of these strategies is that patent-based indicators might be misleading, and deserve to be properly taken into
account for any type of statistical inference at aggregate level.
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LOST PROPERTY GLOBAL PATENT WARMINGclaims in 1980, the total number of claims filed annually at the USPTO now far
exceeds 10 million, ie nine times more than 25 years ago. Although the total workload
at the EPO and JPO is smaller than that of the US Patent Office, the upward trend is
actually more pronounced. In the early 1980s the two regions received about
200,000 claims per year. Now Japan receives nearly four million claims and Europe
five million claims annually, or respectively 19 and 25 times more than in 1980.
Compared to ten years ago, the three offices have seen a doubling of their incoming
workload. Had the number of pages been taken into account, an even more pro-
nounced upward trend in workload would have been observed (cf. Archontopoulos et
al, 2007).
Figure 7. Incoming workload: total number of claims filed, 1980-2007 (millions)
Source: EPO, USPTO and JPO.
3.2 Two worrying consequences
A. Backlogs: alternative ways of looking at them
The explosion in patent filings and the constant increase in their size have led to
backlogs: an ever- increasing stock of pending applications. These backlogs are detri-
mental to the economy because they mean a longer period of economic and legal
uncertainty on the market, in other words large numbers of potentially monopolistic
rights hanging over the market but unresolved, constituting potential threats to other
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tify current attempts to share best practice and achieve some form of mutual recog-
nition of search and examination reports, probably with the ultimate aim of agreeing
mutual recognition of granted patents.
But before entering into work-sharing agreements with the US and others, should
Europe not first pause and examine to what extent backlogs have reached unman-
ageable levels, especially in some patent offices? As this is at least in part a matter
of judgement for individual countries, the question is difficult to address, and only
broad comparisons between countries can be performed. Figure 8 shows the trend in
pending applicationsin Europe, Japan, and the US. It clearly appears that Europe has
the smallest backlog, with about 320,000 applications pending in 2007. This may be
compared with 888,000 pending applications in the US, and more than 760,000 in
Japan. In other words, Europe, though by far the largest economic area, faces a back-
log that is much smaller, about 35 percent that of the US. The number of pending
applications in the European system in 2007 is actually similar to the number of
pending applications at the USPTO as far back as 1996. 
Figure 8. Patent applications under examination, 1996-2007 (000s)
Source: Trilateral Statistical Report (2006).
The backlog of pending claims in the US is also three times larger than in Europe,
which confirms that the backlog issue is primarily a US phenomenon. True, a per
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1996 2000 2007capitaapproach would put the US and Japan on a similar level (5 to 6 claims per 100
head of population). But the backlog of pending claims in the US and Japan would still
be five to six times higher than in Europe.
Figure 9. Total prosecuting time, 2000 and 2007 (millions of months)
Source: Own calculation from data provided in the Trilateral Statistical Report (2008). The figures corre-
spond to the number of patents under examination multiplied by the average pendency of examination
(not search).
However, measuring and comparing backlogs by simply looking at the number of
pending patents or claims provides a biased picture if the duration of examination
varies across countries, which is the case. According to the Trilateral Statistical
Report, the average pendency of patent examination in 2000 was 50 months at the
EPO, nearly twice as long as average pendency at the JPO and the USPTO at 27 and
25 months, respectively. The EPO managed to reduce pendency to 45 months by
2007, whereas it increased in Japan and the US to 32 months. The improvement in
pendency at the EPO is probably the consequence of managerial changes (more
examiners and/or improved monitoring), whereas in the US and Japan the longer
delays probably reflect very high (absolute or relative) backlogs exacerbated by a
steep annual increase in the number of applications.
Figure 9 shows the total number of months (in millions) needed to process the back-
logs of 2000 and 2007 in the three offices. This ‘duration-and-quantity’ approach
shows that in 2000 the three offices were in a similar situation, fluctuating between
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cator suggests that the US is in the most difficult situation, with more than 28 million
months of backlog
14 against 25 million months in Japan and  ’only’ about 14 million
months in Europe. 
In a nutshell, comparing backlogs across regions is far from being straightforward,
However, a few conclusions are robust to the counting methodology. First, the back-
log issue as it stands at present is essentially an American and a Japanese issue. The
backlog might become an issue for the EPO, but it is currently definitely less dramat-
ic than in the case of the USPTO and the JPO.
B. A fall in the quality of patent applications?
A worrying aspect of this surge in the number and size of incoming applications is
that it is definitely associated with a significant drop in the quality (or value) of
applications. The erosion of the average quality of patent applications may be
observed in the changes in a number of patent value indicators. Figure 10 portrays a
negative correlation between the increased propensity to rely on the patent system
in Europe and a corresponding fall in patent value indicators.
A first indicator (%OP) measures the rate of opposition to patents granted by the EPO.
Oppositions are frequently taken as a proxy for the potential market value associat-
ed with a patent
15. Indeed, an opposition would be filed by a firm only if a significant
(actual or expected) market value is attached to the patented invention, otherwise
there would be no need to incur the expense of opposition. The rate of opposition has
constantly fallen over time, suggesting that the average patent is less worthy of
opposition – and thus of lower value - now than in the past (a number of individual
patents will of course still have a high market value). 
A second indicator, the scope-year index developed by van Pottelsberghe and van
Zeebroeck (2008), brings together a score representing the average duration and
average geographical scope of patent protection within the European patent system.
The principle of the indicator is that the longer a patent is enforced and the larger the
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14.The sharp increase in Japan is also due to a change in the patent law, which has decreased the time to request
an examination (from the application date) from seven years to three years. This has led to a higher share of
examination requests.
15.Cf. Harhoff et al. (2003), Sherry and Teece (2004), Reitzig (2004a), Sapsalis et al. (2006), Sapsalis and van
Pottelsberghe (2007) and van Zeebroeck (2008) for empirical evidence on various patent value indicators and
surveys of the literature.geographical scope of protection, the higher the potential value of the patent. The
scope-year index has fallen constantly since the mid-1980s, suggesting that the
average value of patents has been decreasing. A similar conclusion may be drawn
from the average composite value indicator (ACV) in Figure 10), which includes infor-
mation on forward patent citations, renewals, geographical scope and oppositions.
Figure 10. Patent propensity at the EPO vs value indicators, 1982-2000*
* ‘Patent propensity’ is the total number of patents filed at the EPO (Euro-Direct+ PCT-international)
divided by OECD GERD (gross expenditures on business R&D). SYI is the scope-year index put forward
by van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck (2008), which summarises the average geographical scope of
protection and the length of the enforcement period. ACV is the average composite value index put for-
ward by van Zeebroeck (2007b), and %OP is the trend in the rate of opposition to EPO-granted patents. 
Source: Own calculations from EPO and OECD databases, and referred authors.
Combining the evidence provided by these three indicators allows us to conclude
that the average quality of the patents filed at the EPO has dropped over time, as the
propensity to file patent applications has steadily increased. Since the EPO receives
much fewer applications than the USPTO or the JPO (cf. Figure 6), it seems fair to
assume that a similar trend towards lower patent quality and value also applies in
the US and Japan. As far as the USPTO is concerned, the very high but still-growing
propensity to file patent applications probably implies an even more pronounced
drop in average patent value. This supposition is well documented by Jaffe and
Lerner (2004) and Bessen and Meurer (2008) using a large number of examples and
case studies.
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Source: Own calculations from OECD MSTI database on triadic patent filings and patent office data on
total applications. Applications at the EPO include PCT-Regional applications. Triadic applications in
1996: 37,944; in 2000: 45,917 and in 2006: 51,500 (extrapolated from 2005 data).
But there is more evidence of a bigger drop in patent quality in the US and Japan than
in Europe. The share of triadic patents in the total number of patent applications, pre-
sented in Figure 11, provides internationally comparable information on the average
value of patent applications. Triadic patents are applications that are filed simultane-
ously at the USPTO, EPO and JPO. This is often taken as a value indicator because
applicants must bear the translation and prosecuting costs on three different conti-
nents, which are much higher than the costs associated with a domestic or regional
application. It clearly appears that the average value of EPO applications is much
higher (three to four times) than the applications filed at USPTO or JPO. Whereas
nearly 40 percent of EPO applications were simultaneously filed in the US and Japan
in 2006, only 12 percent of the applications filed at the JPO and USPTO were simulta-
neously filed in the other two offices. 
Backlogs and falling quality of patent applications raise important issues. If the trend
towards the filing of low-quality applications were to continue, this would incur need-
less consumption of resources: examiners would increasingly be spending time jus-
tifying refusal of ‘obvious’ inventions. This situation  would certainly not serve the
purpose of patent systems: to stimulate innovation through the provision of tempo-
rary monopolistic rights. Identifying the root causes of this patent inflation might
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suggests that many of the factors driving a reduction of patent quality apply in par-
ticular to the US patent system. 
3.3 Are policymakers to blame?
The main argument developed here is that policymakers (politicians, patent offices,
judges) have contrived to design patent systems in such a way that their current
plight became inevitable. Four dimensions of policymaking have indubitably played a
role in this respect: deciding what is patentable subject matter, allowing flexibility on
prior art (novelty), examination fee levels and the rigour of the examination process
(inventive step). 
A. Patentable subject matter
Policies regarding patentable subject matter partly explain the difference in the
number of patent applications between countries. In the US, the very few restrictions
on patentable subject matter logically lead to more applications. This is striking for
software, business methods, mathematical formulae, scientific discoveries or gene-
related patents, amongst many other technological or scientific domains with lax
patentability restrictions. For software and business methods, for example, it is much
more difficult to identify the prior art properly, because of a lack of codification of
previous ‘inventions’, or because of inventions hidden by source code. Europe is
much more restrictive and forbids the patentability of such subject matter. However,
while the regulation of subject matter may explain differences in the level of patent-
ing, it accounts for little of the sharply rising patent propensity (more patents per
researcher filed over time).
B. Flexibility on identification of prior art
A patent is granted if it satisfies the novelty condition (with respect to the prior art)
and the inventive step (or non-obviousness) requirement. If the content of the sub-
mitted application has been published prior to the filing of the patent, the ‘novelty’
condition is not met and the patent should not be granted. This is theoretically
straightforward and is normally applied quite stringently. According to the UK Trade
Marks, Patents and Design Federation (TMPDF), a timely and high-quality search is
central to the quality of the EPO examination capability:
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examination process can be a waste of time. Moreover, reliably good early
searches can lead applicants to abandon applications that would otherwise
clog the system.’
TMPDF (2008, p. 2)
Five elements of the US patenting process soften the novelty condition and hence
lead to higher patent propensity: the lack of a search report, the grace period, divi-
sional applications, the lack of a pre-grant opposition process and allowing for hidden
applications. None of these peculiarities, which are described in Appendix 2, prevail
in Europe, except for divisional applications.
C. Fee policies
Lax fee policies seem to have contributed to the trend towards a higher propensity to
file patents. Although still rarely considered as effective policy leverage, patent fees
do matter. Recent quantitative evidence confirms that applicants’ behaviour is influ-
enced by the fee structure of patent offices
16. In Japan entry fees (ie filing and search
fees) have always been very low, virtually zero (cf. de Rassenfosse and van
Pottelsberghe, 2008b). In the US they have fluctuated between 500 and 700 USD
PPPs, whereas Europe is slightly more expensive. For all the fees up to the grant of a
patent (filing, search and examination), Japan and the US have cumulated fees of
about 2000 USD PPPs, whereas cumulated fees in Europe are about 5000 USD PPPs.
This downward trend in entry and cumulated fees up to the grant has probably
encouraged the increase in patent filings at the EPO. The relatively very low fees in
Japan and the US partly explain the large number of patent filings observed in these
two countries. 
16.Several observers frequently argue that fees should not play an important role because they constitute only a
fraction of total patenting costs (which include services provided by attorneys, drafting support, search for prior
art). These costs are difficult to approximate (van Pottelsberghe and Mejer, 2008) and are indeed substantial.
However, for large firms with an IP department these costs could be considered as fixed costs, whereas filing fees
and renewal fees are by definition variable costs. Quantitative techniques must therefore be used to assess
whether fees influence applicants’ behaviour: see de Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2007, 2008a) for evi-
dence about the influence of national filing fees on the number of priority applications; Harhoff et al. (2007,
2009) for the influence of validation fees, renewal fees and translation costs on the chosen geographical scope
for protection; Archontopoulos et al. (2007) for the impact of claim-based fees. De Rassenfosse and van
Pottelsberghe (2008b) perform the first evaluation of fee elasticity with time series. All these studies confirm
that fees do affect the behaviour of applicants, with a price elasticity of demand for patents fluctuating around 
-0.4: an increase of 10 percent in fees would lead to a drop in demand for patents of about four percent.
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‘...The ‘problem’ is that patents being issued today do not generate the
confidence and respect in the public that, as a matter of public policy, one would
expect.  The bad press and attacks on patents in general have eroded confi-
dence in all patents.  An inventor who obtains a patent cannot enjoy as much of
the benefits of the patent as public policy would dictate. The ‘solution’, which is
almost universally touted, is to improve patent quality.  Patents should be
issued for inventions which are new, useful, and fully disclosed.  Inventions that
do not meet all three requirements should not be issued.’ 
Blog written by Russ Krajec, US registered patent attorney
17
Grant rates for patents – the ratio of applications to granted patents – might shed
light on the rigour of patent examination and thus also on patent quality. However,
while such an analysis can be performed with a degree of caution for Europe,
international comparisons are much more complex. This is attributable to the fact
that ‘real’ grant rates are difficult to compute (due to the use of so-called divisional
applications or continuation in parts and to the possibility of filing numerous similar
applications). Alternative indicators must therefore be computed to assess patent
offices’ rigour
18. Several alternative indicators of rigour in patent offices’ work are pre-
sented in Table 4. These indicators include differences in relative workload per exam-
iner, pendency of examination, and corrected grant rates. The first three columns
report the number of examiners, the number of incoming applications and the
number of patents granted. In 2007 the USPTO is by far the largest patent office in
terms of the number of examiners (5,376).
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 4 show the ratio of incoming applications per
examiner. The IN/EX column represent the total number of patents filed per examiner
and the INC/EX column represents the total number of claims filed per examiner. An
examiner at the USPTO received on average 85 incoming applications in 2007, where-
as at the EPO the workload per examiner was less than half of this (36). If the number
of claims filed per examiner is considered (column INC/EX), the average USPTO exam-
iner must tackle about four times more claims than his EPO counterpart. At the EPO
(the USPTO) about 538 (2036) claims were filed per examiner in 2007. 
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17.Blog ‘Everything under the sun made by man’, contribution entitled ‘McCain vs Obama on IP Issues:  There is No
Contest’ posted on Thursday, 28 August 2008. Russ Krajec is a registered patent attorney, engineer and inventor
with over 20 US patents. http://www.krajec.com/index.php?/weblog/index/.
18.See van Pottelsberghe and François (2009) for an early analysis of the rigour of patent offices based on these
indicators.The trend in the workload of examiners over a 10-year period is depicted in Figure 12.
From 2000 to 2004 each USPTO (JPO) examiner had to process an annual workflow
of more than 2500 (1500) claims. This is five (three) times more than the average
workload of a European examiner. Since 2004 some convergence has been visible.
The USPTO recruited nearly 2,000 new examiners between 2002 and 2007. That the
backlog has continued to rise is probably due to the time required to train new exam-
iners. However, regardless of the trend, US workload per examiner remains four times
higher than in Europe.
Table 4: Rigour in patent production process, 2007
Data source: Adapted from referenced papers and from the data provided in the Trilateral Statistical
Report, 2007, and the WIPO annual report of 2008. The number of applications at the EPO includes PCT-
Regional filings (EPO-R). KIPO: South Korea, SIPO: China, IN-PO: India.
* In Japan the search process is outsourced to an external organisation composed of about 1,300 per-
sons (retired examiners, freelances), which results in a biasing of  ‘per-examiner’ comparisons which
include Japan.
** Quillen and Webster (2001) and Quillen et al. (2002) put forward corrected grant rates for the period
1995 to 1999 for the EPO and the JPO, and for the period 1993 to 1998 for the USPTO. The authors show
that the USPTO grant rate (allowances divided by total disposals, ie the sum of allowances and abandon-
ments), corrected for continuous applications, ranges from 87-97 percent, depending on the extent to
which prosecution of abandoned applications was continued in re-filed applications. 
† The share of patent applications for which a request for examination is filed is 100 percent at the
USPTO (where an application is automatically examined); 94 percent at the EPO and 67 percent at the
JPO. The share is smaller in Japan because the applicants can wait up to three years before requesting
an examination. 
*** INC stands for the total number of claims included in patent applications, which are computed from
the average number of claims per patent filed: 24 at the USPTO, 23 for PCT international applications filed
at the EPO, 15 for  patent applications at the EPO including transferred PCT (or PCT regional); and 9 at
the JPO. The data is not available for other patent offices.
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Examiners
(EX)
Application
(IN)
Grant
(OUT)
IN †
/EX
INC †***
/EX
OUT
/EX
Pendency
in months
Grant
rate**
USPTO 5376 456154 157283 85 2036 29 32 87-97%
JPO * 1468 396291 164954 208 1255 112 (36)+32.4 0.64
EPO (PCT-R) 3689 140763 54699 36 538 15 (18)+45.3 0.67
KIPO 660 172469 123705 261 NA 187 15 NA
SIPO 2672 245161 67948 92 NA 25 26 NA
IN-PO 133 28940 8000 218 NA 60 NA NAFigure 12: Trend in the annual number of claims under examination per examiner,
1996-2006 (000s).
Source: Own computation from USPTO, EPO, JPO information on patent filings and average number of
claims; and from the Trilateral Statistical Report. For both Japan and the EPO we take into account only
the patents that are actually subject to an examination request (a proportion of total applications).
The column OUT/EX in Table 4 shows that the actual amount of work performed per
examiner is also twice as high in the US as in Europe. The European examiner grants
on average 15 patents per year, against 29 in the US, 25 in China and more in Japan
and the rest of Asia. These figures suggest that both the incoming workload of exam-
iners and their actual output are two to four times higher at the USPTO and Asian
patent offices than at the EPO. One explanation for this overwhelming difference
might be attributable to the average time spent by examiners on each patent, which
may in turn correlate with higher patent quality in Europe.
The EPO has the longest average pendency rate (63 months, or five years, made up
of 18 months for the search report and 45 months for the substantive examination)
compared to the JPO (32 months of examination, but a much longer period to decide
whether the patent should be examined or not) and the USPTO (32 months, all inclu-
sive!). It is worth noting that the examination pendency has actually fallen to 45
months at the EPO over the past eight years (it was 50 months in 2000), whereas it
has increased at the USPTO and the JPO over the same period (it was 25 and 27
months, respectively, for the year 2000). These divergent developments confirm
once again that the backlog is more a US or Japanese issue than a European one; this
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EPO (PCT-R)suggests that quality may be higher in Europe as a result.
A slower process might mean that examiners spend more time on each patent appli-
cation. Assuming similar analytical skills, it can logically be inferred that EPO exam-
iners' decisions are based on more detailed knowledge of the prior art and a more in-
depth analysis of the patented invention. This, in turn, would lead to a higher quality
patent (ie higher rates of withdrawal or refusal)
19. The fact that it lasts longer in
Europe indubitably correlates with a higher degree of rigour and thus patent quality.
Table 5 summarises the empirical evidence on patent quality.
Table 5: On the design of patent systems
* WIPO statistical series, 2008; for Europe the figure on patents enforced applies to Germany. ** For the
average number of claims per patent in force we follow a conservative working hypothesis of 20 claims
per patent for the US, 15 for Europe and five for Japan.
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19.Lazaridis and van Pottelsberghe (2007) show that nearly half of the withdrawals could be considered as being
caused by the work of EPO examiners, because they occur just after a communication from the examiner. This fig-
ure suggests greater rigour in the examination process than would be reflected by the simple refusal rate (a bit
more than five percent).
USA Japan Europe
Structural factors
Many patentable subject matters +++ + +
High flexibility w.r.t. prior art +++ ++ +
Hidden applications allowed +++ + +
Low fees +++ +++ +
Opposition process no yes yes
Human factors and rigour
Workload per examiner +++ ++ +
Short Pendency (fast) +++ + +
High turnover, low experience +++ +(+) +
High corrected grant rate +++ + +
Impact on applicants’ behaviour
Higher propensity to patent +++ ++ +
Strategic filing, larger patents +++ ++ ++
Impact on patent systems
Backlog and delays +++ ++ +
Drop in quality/value +++ ++ +
Patents enforced in 2007 (millions)* 1.8 1.2 0.5
Claims enforced in 2007 (millions)** 36.2 6 7.5BOX. 1: EXAMINERS’ INCENTIVES AND EXPERIENCE
An additional indicator of higher quality in the European patent system is relat-
ed to the turnover of the examiner workforce, and hence its average experience.
Annual turnover of the USPTO workforce was about 33 percent in the early
2000s: about one employee out of three would leave the office each year, or
each examiner would spend on average three years at the USPTO before joining
the business sector (generally recruited by firms relying on the patent
system). The incentive to leave the office is probably related to employment
conditions. USPTO examiners are civil servants and not highly paid
20. This
situation is to be compared with the EPO, with a very low annual turnover in the
workforce (less than five percent) and high wages, as the examiner is required
to demonstrate a high level of education, speak several languages and has the
status of an international civil servant. 
Would these remuneration and turnover differences correlate with the quality of
the examination process? The answer is yes, definitely. An examiner at the EPO
is recognised as fully operational after five years of training and experience,
whereas at the USPTO examiners until recently left after 3-4 years. Since the
examination process is complex, technical and legally binding, examiners with
longer experience obviously deliver a higher-quality service on average, even if
it is on account of the high remuneration that examiners choose to remain
working for lengthy periods at the EPO
21. 
It seems that the USPTO is gradually changing its employment conditions, pro-
viding substantial seniority-based premiums, and in 2008 achieved a signifi-
cant fall in the turnover of examiners. History will tell us whether this reduction
in turnover resulted more from the premiums or from the current financial crisis
and economic slowdown. At any rate, the USPTO’s corrected grant rate of 87-97
percent makes the USPTO a more ‘applicant-friendly’ patent office than the EPO
and JPO, which have grant rates of 67 percent and 64 percent respectively.
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20.Regarding the USPTO, Lemley reports that ‘There are strong structural and psychological pressures on examiners
to issue patents rather than rejecting applications, no matter how weak the alleged invention seems.’ Marc
Lemley (2001, footnote 5).
21.This positive correlation between an examiner’s experience and the quality of her work is further documented by
the British Trade Mark, Patents & Design Federation: ‘A number of our members have experienced poor quality
search and examination, which some attribute to the work of new recruits who have had less training and super-
vision than used to be provided,’TMPDF (2008, p.3).3.4 US patent dumping?
The Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) – the international patent regime under WIPO –
actually supplies more convincing evidence about the attractiveness of the EPO, and
its perception as a provider of high-quality search reports (cf. Appendix 1). A patent
applicant wanting international protection can select the search authority among the
patent offices that are recognised as International Search Authorities by the appli-
cant’s own patent office. Two indicators may therefore help to gauge the perceived
quality of a patent office: the extent to which it is recognised as a search authority by
other patent offices, and the extent to which it is actually selected by foreign appli-
cants to perform an international search report and draw up an opinion on
patentability. 
Of all the patent offices, the EPO is most frequently designated as search authority to
perform searches for other countries’ PCT filings (see Appendix 6). Figure 13, on the
next page, displays the number of PCT applications received by the JPO, USPTO and
EPO and the number of search reports performed by the same offices. Whereas the
EPO received a little over 26,000 PCT applications in 2007, primarily from European
applicants, it searched nearly 74,000 PCT applications. The USPTO clearly produces
far fewer search reports (less than 30,000) than it receives (53,000). In other
words, the EPO does much more for the rest of the world than the reverse. Since PCT
filing fees do not compensate for the actual cost of performing a reliable search
report, one may conclude that the EPO to some extent subsidises innovation in the
rest of the world.
The US, arguably the country with the most dramatic patent backlog in the world, has
moved to tackle the backlog in two different ways. The first one is to recognise foreign
patent offices with different organisational designs and fee structures as
International Search Authorities for US PCT applications (KIPO and the Australian
patent office provide PCT search services for relatively low fees).
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LOST PROPERTY GLOBAL PATENT WARMINGFigure 13: Europe to the rescue of global backlogs? Received and searched PCT
applications, 2000 and 2007 (thousands)
Source: Own computations from data provided in the Trilateral Statistical Report, 2007.
The second one is to conclude agreements for the creation of so-called Patent
Prosecution Highways (PPHs): one with Japan and one with the UK (and these two
offices have also signed a bilateral agreement with each other). These PPHs involve
sharing and recognising each other’s patent examination reports. The offices hope
that the PPHs  save significant application time for patent holders. An applicant who
has had an examination report produced by one office benefits from accelerated
treatment from the other office. These agreements are warmly welcomed by
policymakers:
‘The Patent Prosecution Highway agreement between the UK-IPO and the
USPTO will enhance the operational efficiency of both agencies and improve
patent quality,’ said Lord Triesman, parliamentary undersecretary of state for
intellectual property and quality. ‘The agreement will help to efficiently and
effectively safeguard inventors' intellectual property and help to stimulate
innovation on a national and international scale [...].
[...]  the aim of the patent offices is to create a wide-ranging network of
such agreements [...]
[...] The PPH helps both offices in their goal of stimulating and rewarding
invention and innovation and is a further step towards a global patent
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Searchedprosecution highway network.’ 
‘Our collective goal is to reduce duplication of work, speed up processing,
and improve quality,’ said Jon Dudas, director of the USPTO. ‘This pilot project
with the UK builds on work with the Japanese Patent Office, and contributes to
a more rational international patent system.’
‘UK and US team-tag to speed patent prosecution process’
(Out-law.com, 2007b)
The EPO and the USPTO have now signed a similar agreement, described in Appendix
3. The use of other offices’ work is already common practice, and has not required a
special agreement or partnership. What the PPH agreements add is accelerated treat-
ment if the patent has already been examined abroad. Whether such accelerated
treatment will lead to a ‘more rational international patent system that speeds up
processing and improves quality’is far from assured, especially if it is acknowledged
that fees and quality vary substantially across countries, and that they both matter. 
Companies may choose to file several applications in the cheapest office with the
lowest quality examination services, and then extend these applications (based on a
single, relatively low-quality report) to the other two offices under the accelerated
treatment facility. But this practice may drive low-quality processing of backlogs, as
speed is not synonymous with quality.
To sum up: as long as the quality of the examination process is not harmonised, it can
fairly be argued that the recent moves towards global work-sharing and mutual
recognition agreements might actually drive global patent quality down towards the
lowest level available. And specifically for Europe, the current and understandable
attempt of the USPTO to outsource evaluation of its own applications through the des-
ignation of low-cost PCT search offices and through bilateral agreements with Japan,
the UK and the EPO, may actually drive down patent quality in Europe.
It is also striking to see certain national patent offices in Europe adopting national
positions which seem to be at odds with the interests of the EPO.  There are two clear
examples of this. First, the Austrian patent office offers the cheapest (with South
Korea) PCT search and preliminary examination reports in the world, each costing
€200, against €1,700 at the EPO. Second, the UK-IPO has signed two Patent
Prosecution Highways with the US and Japan, apparently independently of the EPO.
These two autonomous and internationally visible positions bear witness to the lack
of a centralised and strong European approach to the global patent backlog issue, and
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The global patent warming problem is a major challenge for Europe, coming on top of
Europe’s own internal, home-made problem: its fragmented patent system.
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recommendations
‘Patents should draw a line between the things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.
Patents are, after all, government-enforced monopolies and so there should be
some 'embarrassment' (and hesitation) in granting them.’
Thomas Jefferson (1794)
Chapter 2 illustrated the economic incongruities created by a fragmented patent
system: the lack of an integrated system in Europe, or the 40 year-long attempt to
establish a Community patent, generating prohibitive costs, a high level of uncertain-
ty, and a low-quality grant system owing to parallel national routes and the ultimate
power of national jurisdictions over patent enforcement issues. These incongruities
actually cancel out the high-quality examination services provided by the EPO.
Chapter 3 shows that the relatively high rigour of the EPO examination process can
be considered to be, jointly with the level of examination fees and other components
of the design of its system, a key element which has led to smaller demand for
patents in Europe than in the US or Japan, and hence a relatively small and much less
worrying backlog. However, the EPO has entered into mutual recognition processes
(through PPHs) that might actually harm the quality of its own examination services. 
Two types of policy recommendation can therefore be formulated, first with respect
to what could be done in Europe to create and effectively leverage a European patent
system (section 4.1). The second set of recommendations concern the role of Europe
(and of the EPO) in the global arena, especially in the context of current attempts to
share work and exploit economies of scale (section 4.2). Here, a global patent stan-
dard (GPS) charter – minimum international patent quality benchmarks – would be
an essential preliminary step which would subsequently open the door to effective
recognition of the work performed by examiners across the world.4.1 Build Europe
Europe’s patent system has at its centre the EPO (European Patent Office), which
grants patents on behalf of the 35 member countries of the EPC (European Patent
Convention. Most applications at the EPO are second filings of first (‘priority’) filings
at national patent offices. Once granted by the EPO, the European patent must be val-
idated and enforced in each member country, with nationally applicable validation
fees, translation requirements and renewal fees. The Community patent project,
which has been on the negotiating table since 1962, seeks to provide a ‘one-stop-
shop’ for obtaining patent protection in the EU: once granted the Community patent
would be enforced automatically in the EU, with a single renewal fee schedule cover-
ing all countries. Any cross-border litigation could then be dealt with through a
centralised European litigation system, and ultimately in the European Court of
Justice. The Community patent would be an additional, parallel, patent protection
route in Europe, alongside the European patent. Companies would be free to choose
between the European patent and the Community patent at the time of the EPO’s
grant decision.
The Community patent and a centralised litigation system
The Community patent and a unified and integrated European patent litigation
system are key ingredients for ensuring that the EU single market works properly.
The failure to implement them means missed opportunities. It is paradoxical to have
a patent office – the EPO – that covers the largest market in the world, and which
ensures high-quality examination services, but has not contributed to the develop-
ment of the largest market for technology due to prohibitive cumulated enforcement
costs and a high level of legal uncertainty. If European governments wish to foster
innovation and create a suitable environment for fast-growing technology-based
firms, the Community patent project should become a prime objective. A centralised
patent litigation system would reduce the prohibitive costs caused by parallel litiga-
tion and ease the uncertainty generated by differing litigation outcomes
22.
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22.Local chambers for infringement and counterfeiting issues should be created, which would then lead to a central
chamber for patent validity issues (and then back to the local chamber for infringement and counterfeiting) that
could be used by third countries as well. The system should ensure that at least one member of the local cham-
ber would be part of the centralised process, in order to keep a degree of coherence in the assessment. This is
required because during the invalidity proceedings patent holders try to reduce the interpretation of the claims
(ie limit the breadth of protection associated with the patent), whereas during infringement proceedings patent
holders logically try to broaden the interpretation of the claims.BOX 2: TURNING THE CRISIS INTO AN OPPORTUNITY? LEARNING FROM HISTORY
It is tempting to draw a parallel between the current attempts to create a
centralised patent system in Europe and similar attempts by the German
Empire several years after its creation in 1871. Each of the German states had
its own patent system, or else no specific protection for inventions at all (eg
Hamburg and Bremen). According to Seckelmann (2001) the differing econom-
ic legislation within Germany inhibited the development of an internal market
between the member states of the German Custom Union (Zollverein). The
states were rather in favour of mutual recognition of their patent regulations.
Interestingly Prussia, the largest state, actually followed a policy that consist-
ed in banning patent legislation. After years of public debate, the first signifi-
cant economic crisis of the Empire in 1873, and thanks to the prominent role of
Werner Siemens, the German Patent Act was enacted by the Parliament in July
1877, with a centralised Imperial Patent Office being the only authority to grant
patents. 
The German Patent Act was not only a quantum leap towards centralisation and
rationalisation, but it also provided unique incentives to German industry to
perform costly development, and hence became a cornerstone of Germany’s
national innovation system (Otto, 1993). Seckelmann (2001) reports that in
1900 the German dyestuff industry held 90 percent of the world market, an
achievement that would not have been possible without the legal stability
provided by the patent act of 1877
23. 
The current economic crisis offers two unexpected opportunities. For global
patent systems in general, the crisis will lead to a significant drop in patent
applications, hence contributing to a reduction of backlogs, assuming patent
offices do not reduce existing resources. For the European patent system,
creating the Community patent would not only strengthen the effectiveness of
the patent system but also send a powerful symbol that Europe has the
political will to create a single market for new technologies.
23.This idea was already coined by Weber (1924), who suggested that international trade could expand as a result
of international legal stability. Capitalism requires a highly predictable legal system, as illustrated by the impact
of the first national patent law, the statute of monopolies of 1623 in England, which played a major role during
the first industrial revolution. North (1981) imputes the economic success of the western world to the legal
framework that secured returns on investment, including the patent laws that protected emerging industries.
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routes to patent protection in Europe. National patent offices (NPOs) could con-
tribute to limiting the abusive behaviour sometimes adopted by applicants, in partic-
ular the practice of filing simultaneously at the EPO and at several NPOs so as to max-
imise the probability of getting something granted. It is proposed that NPOs should
stop granting patents altogether and instead strengthen their services to domestic
innovators, including training, search and coaching services to young innovative
companies. They could also be information providers to local business on counterfeit-
ing issues. Their search capability could be used mainly to provide search reports
(including for PCT  applications) and – at most – non-binding opinions on
patentability. Their funding would be ensured by the renewal fee receipts generated
by the new Community patent
24.
Reform of EPO governance as a catalyst for change
A patent policy is more effective when it is coordinated with other policies that affect
innovation. The objective of a patent system is to stimulate innovation, which is also,
directly or indirectly, the objective of competition, industrial, and science and tech-
nology policies. These regulatory or R&D-funding policies interact with the patent
system and hence need a minimum level of coordination.
So far there is no patent-related coordination between policies that affect innovation
performance. The administrative council of the EPO is essentially composed of the
representatives of national patent offices. The 35 member countries frequently have
divergent – and sometimes conflicting – interests to those of the EPO. But it is these
same members that elect the president of the EPO and the five vice-presidents. 
In order to ensure smooth decision-making and proper representation, the EPO
administrative council should include representatives of major stakeholders of the
patent system and a reduced number of NPO members acting as representatives of
all NPOs. This arrangement would not preclude holding an annual EPO general assem-
bly which all NPOs could attend. This new EPO governance structure is described in
Box 3.
The new administrative council would include representatives of the business sector
(large and small firms), representatives of consumer associations and
45
LOST PROPERTY CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
24.Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2009) perform simulations that suggest that most national patent offices would
earn more money from renewal fees with the Community patent than without it.representatives from the academic sector (academic networks and technology
transfer office associations). In addition, four members of the European Commission
should have a seat: the commissioners in charge of research, competition, enterprise
and the internal market.
The fee policy
The fee policy must get the incentives right. Excessively high fees make the patent
system prohibitive, whereas fees pitched too low make it too easy to file inventions
of dubious merit. It is important to distinguish between examination fees and after-
grant fees and costs. The USPTO has very low fees both before and after the grant. The
EPO has higher fees for the examination process (including filing, search and exam-
ination), and prohibitive fees and costs after the grant as a result of translation
requirements and cumulative renewal fees that must be paid each year in each
country where protection is required.
BOX 3: TIME FOR NEW GOVERNANCE AT THE EPO?
Current EPO administrative council Future EPO administrative council
35 NPOs 10 member country representatives
(NPOs)
Observers: Representatives of:
European Commission Consumer associations
BusinessEurope Business associations
Patent attorneys Academia
Technology transfer offices
Patent attorneys
Centralised patent litigation institution
1 independent member
European Commissioners for research,
internal market, enterprise and
competition
Observer from the European Parliament
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forming a high-quality search and examination. In this respect, Europe, with a market
of 500 million inhabitants (EU alone), can have cumulated up-to-grant fees that are
higher in absolute terms than in the US, while keeping relative costs (cost per capita,
or per market unit) competitive. Sufficiently high absolute fees are needed to justify
a minimum degree of quality in the examination process and to ensure a certain self-
selection of applications. Low fees result in more applications and do not generate
enough resources to ensure a high-quality examination process. The system should
avoid a sudden increase in fees or costs just after the grant of the patent by the EPO,
because it stimulates firms to adopt filing strategies aiming at delaying the grant
date. The Community patent could obviously provide a response to this issue. The fee
structure of the Community patent should be set at a level that corresponds to the
cumulated renewal fees that are currently paid by patent owners, which is equivalent
to renewal fees in about four countries over the life-span of a patent
25.
Create an SME status
Young innovative companies and SMEs lack resources and managerial time to tackle
patent enforcement issues properly. In addition, though governments purport to
favour SMEs with a potentially global reach (through exports and foreign direct
investment), the current system actually constitutes a barrier to internationalisa-
tion. While with a Community patent these firms would benefit from EU-wide protec-
tion, entry costs could still be prohibitive.
It is therefore urgent to create a long-awaited SME patent status at EU level, as the
USPTO and the JPO have had for many years. This would imply setting reduced SME
fees at the EPO at, for instance, about half the fee level applicable to other companies.
4.2 A Global Patent Standard
Out of the millions of patents filed at the main patent offices each year, a significant
share, at least 10 percent, are so-called triadic patents filed simultaneously in Japan,
the US and Europe. The share of bilateral applications to the USPTO and the EPO is
much higher: 14 percent of USPTO filings come from Europe and 25 percent of EPO
filings come from the US. Needless to say, major cost and time savings could
25.Danguy and van Pottelsberghe (2009) show that with a renewal fee structure equivalent to about four countries,
the Community patent would generate higher renewal fee receipts than the current European patent does in all
national patent offices combined. The data presented in van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck (2008) confirms
that the patents that have been enforced for 15 years are generally valid in about four countries.
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towards work sharing and/or mutual recognition at the global level is certainly to be
welcomed. There is clear political will to reach global economies of scale whereby a
patent granted, say, in the US would also be considered to be granted in Europe. The
G20 has put forward the idea of a global litigation court that would be hosted by WIPO
in Geneva. The Patent Prosecution Highways (PPHs) also evidence a strong will for
mutual recognition of search and examination reports.
We have argued that PPH agreements as presently conceived are not a panacea
because they may reduce global patent quality further through their ‘fast-track’ com-
ponent – a clear route towards a race to the bottom. We propose that examiners
should be free to use the work performed by others without any requirement to deal
with such patents by an accelerated procedure. 
In general, convergence projects that focus on the output of patent systems instead
of input – the absolute quality of the examination process - should be avoided. Be it
the PPHs launched in 2008 or the World Intellectual Property Court envisioned by the
G20 in April 2009, no convergence project can afford to skirt the difficult issue of
creating a global patent standard (GPS). 
Global convergence should evidently first tackle the key patentability conditions
(novelty, inventive step, applicability) and secure the main pay-back for society at
large (dissemination of information about an invention so others can build on it or
focus on something else). Three broad dimensions should therefore be addressed:
access to information, structural factors influencing the search and examination
process, and the human factor (see Box 4 for a detailed list of convergence issues).
GPS: Free access to key information
Free access to patent information – a key part of the patent bargain – is a myth
today. Many players (especially SMEs, universities, independent inventors) do not
have ready access to information about granted or pending patents. Improved
transparency, which would re-install confidence in the system, could be achieved if
the following key information sources were freely and readily available to all online:
search tools and databases needed to investigate prior art; all patent applications
within 18 months after their first filing; requests for use of any accelerated proce-
dure; all patents currently in force in a given country. In a similar vein, full and free
sharing of search and examination reports by examiners would contribute to
reducing pendency and hence backlogs.
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Structural convergence between systems is a logical preliminary and necessary con-
dition for embarking on any form of effective mutual recognition of the work per-
formed by third offices. This is required because structural processes (patent grant
criteria and rules) influence the speed and outcome of examinations. Global
convergence should tackle the following dimensions: the identification of ownership
of the invention (first-to-file versus first-to-invent); the methodology used to assess
the inventive step; the time allowed to reply to a communication by the examiner (ie
to reply to a question to elicit further information); the selection of patentable subject
matter; the possibility to split a patent; the grace period (ie leeway for scien-
tists/researchers to file); the level of fees; and the possibility for third parties to file
an opposition before the patent office (before/instead of having to attempt the more
costly litigation route).
GPS: Examiners’ skills and incentives
Although rarely acknowledged, the key factor in patent systems resides in the exam-
ination work performed by individual examiners. The quality of their work depends on
their workload, their experience as an examiner, their education and training in their
technological area, the speed at which they have to process an application, and their
incentives. A convergence of patent systems would therefore logically require
convergence of human resource practices, including incentives to keep experienced
examiners, training schemes to stay up to date with technological progress, recruit-
ment policies based on relevant skills, and individual performance indicators.
By way of epilogue: unfortunately only a few of these convergence themes (free and
ready access to information, structural issues, and human resource policy at patent
offices) are part of the coordination package signed by the five major global patent
offices on 14 November, 2008 (see Appendix 4).
The US has recently taken steps designed to improve patent quality. First, informal
contacts confirm policy moves in the form of seniority-based wage premia for US
patent examiners. Second, on October 30 2008, the US Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (CAFC) ruled that many existing business-method patents are invalid
or substantially limited in scope. This decision will most probably restrict the
patentability of software and business methods in the US
26. Third, the first-to-file
26.In its 30 October 2008 decision (Ex Parte Bilski) the CAFC  subscribed to the ‘machine-or-transformation test,’
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are encouraging signs, but constitute only small steps along the way towards what
could be deemed a true global patent standard. The OECD and WIPO might well be
appropriate places to foster further discussion on global patent standards.
BOX 4: A GLOBAL PATENT STANDARD – THREE KEY AREAS OF CONVERGENCE
DOMAINS OF QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
Access to information
Open access to patent offices’ search tools and databases
Publication of all patent applications after 18 months
Publication of requests for accelerated search/examination
Publication and ready access to patents in force
Publication of patents available for licencing
Structural factors
First to invent (F2I) vs first to file (F2F) for ownership
Requirements for novelty and inventive step
Patentable subject matter (business methods, software, discoveries, formulae)
Forbid several generations of ‘divisionals’ and/or ‘continuation in parts’
Deadline (three months) for replying to a communication by examiner
Fees (filing, search, examination) should be cost covering
Pre-grant opposition process
Grace period for scientists and researchers
The examiner
Education level
Training schemes
Average experience at patent office
Turnover of employees
Incentive mechanism
Performance measurement decoupled from grant decisions
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which is what the standard used to be in the 1970s. To be valid, the inventor must show that his business method
is either ‘tied to a particular machine or apparatus,’ or ‘transform[s] a particular article into a different state or
thing.’ The CAFC ruled that if neither of these tests is met, then the business method is not patentable.References
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LOST PROPERTY REFERENCESAppendix 1.
The patent jargon: key terms and
basic process  
This section provides basic definitions of specialised terms used in this book. 
Intellectual property rights 
Patent: a legal title protecting commercial ideas or inventions whereby the owner can
prevent others from making or selling the idea/invention.
Trademark: a legal title protecting names, words, symbols or devices.
Copyright: a legal title protecting the expression of ideas (creative work, authorship)
in the form of software, text, characters and songs.
Patent institutions
EPC: European Patent Convention, signed in 1978, included 35 member states in May
2009
EPO: European Patent Organisation, created in 1978, grants patents on behalf of EPC
member states
JPO: Japanese Patent Office
KIPO: South Korean Patent Office
NPOs: National patent offices of the EPC member states
PCT: Patent Cooperation Treaty
SIPO: Chinese Patent Office
USPTO: US Patent and Trademark Office
WIPO: World Intellectual Property OrganizationBasic patenting process
27
According to Articles 52 and 53 of the European Patent Convention (EPC), an
invention must satisfy three main conditions for a patent to be granted: i) be new; ii)
involve an inventive step (be non-obvious); and iii) be capable of commercial appli-
cation. In addition the invention must be a patentable subject matter, for which there
is a more stringent test in Europe and Japan than in the US
28. 
Novelty is a condition requiring good knowledge of the published state of the art at
the date of first filing of the patent. The applicant cites the prior art that is related to
the invention, which is generally published in patent databases and technical or sci-
entific journals. In Europe and Japan, a ‘search report’ is published 18 months after
the date of first filing, along with the filed document. The search report lists all pub-
lished material related to the invention and checks whether the invention is novel
with respect to this state of the art. The search report may also include citations
identified by the patent examiner that were not quoted in the filed document. If the
search report confirms the novelty of the invention, the applicant may request a sub-
stantive examinationof the application. This examination aims at assessing whether
the invention involves an inventive stepfor a person normally skilled in the art.
In return for the protection provided by the patent, the invention must be disclosed in
detail, so that everyone can benefit from it. This disclosure in exchange for patent
protection is also known as the ‘patent bargain’. Patents provide dynamic efficiency
that compensates for their static inefficiency. The latter comes from the monopolis-
tic prices that can be set, and hence a lower level of consumption than in a more com-
petitive environment. On the other hand patents provide dynamic efficiency that con-
sists in the creation of knowledge and innovation which, while commercially protect-
ed, is available to others and potentially benefits the economy as a whole.
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27.A more detailed explanation of patenting procedures is presented in Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2007),
chapters 1 and 6.
28. For instance, several fields, including discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods, aesthetic cre-
ations, schemes, rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing business, programs for
computers and presentations of information are not considered to be inventions if the European patent applica-
tion only relates to such subject-matter or activities as such. In addition to this, inventions falling into any of the
following categories are excluded from patentability: i) inventions whose commercial exploitation would be con-
trary to the public interest or would be immoral; ii) plants and animal varieties or essentially biological process-
es for producing plants or animals (microbiological processes and products thereof are not excluded); iii) meth-
ods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practised on the
human or animal body (products, substances and compositions for use in such methods, eg medicines or surgi-
cal instruments are not excluded).The global patent system is quite complex, as various routes can be followed to gain
protection in a given geographical environment. Figure 14 shows a simplified process.
Once an invention is generated, the applicant may choose between three options:
keep it secret, publish it, or file a patent to try to exclude others from using it. 
Assuming that the inventor wishes to protect the invention on his domestic market,
the first stage consists of a ‘priority filing’ at a national patent office. The date of
receipt of the application is called the ‘priority date’, for which all previously published
material (patents, scientific articles) will constitute the ‘prior art’. Since the
international Paris Convention of 1883, an applicant has one year to extend an appli-
cation abroad without risking loss of the patent on the grounds of lack of novelty. The
international extension consisting of filing a foreign application within one year of
the priority date is depicted as route 1 in Figure 14. 
However, one year is often considered too short for the evaluation of an invention’s
economic potential. Thus the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), ratified in 1970, intro-
duced the possibility of delaying further the extension of the application abroad while
still fulfilling the novelty criterion. The PCT route, or route 2 in Figure 14, allows inven-
tors to wait for up to 32 months before deciding to file an application abroad. 
It is important to keep in mind that a PCT application as such is not an application for
the grant of a patent, and the application is not converted into a patent unless and
until the application is lodged with the national patent office of the foreign country or
countries concerned. It should be added that the 32-month period allows inventors to
delay incurring the fees and translation costs which become payable once the appli-
cation is submitted to national patent offices abroad. 
The first step of the international application procedure is filing with a suitable patent
office, called a Receiving Office (RO). A search is then carried out by an authorised
International Search Authority (ISA) to find the most relevant prior art documents
regarding the claimed subject matter. This procedure results in an International
Search Report (ISR), together with a written opinion regarding patentability
29. 
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29.International Search Authorities (ISA) and International Preliminary Examining Authorities (IPEA) include: 1.
Austrian Patent Office; 2. Australian Patent Office; 3. Canadian Intellectual Property Office); 4. State Intellectual
Property Office of the People’s Republic of China; 5. European Patent Office; 6. Spanish Patent and Trademark
Office; 7. National Board of Patents and Registration of Finland; 8. Japan Patent Office; 9. Korean Intellectual
Property Office; 10. Federal Service for Intellectual Property, Patents and Trademarks (Russian Federation); 11.
Swedish Patent and Registration Office; 12. United States Patent and Trademark Office; 13. Nordic Patent
Institute. All International Search Authorities are also International Preliminary Examining Authorities.Be it under the Paris Convention route or the PCT route, a search report is published
together with the international application no later than 18 months after the filing
date. The international search report of the PCT route helps the applicant to decide
whether it would be worth seeking protection abroad and in how many countries.
Figure 14: Patent processes and patenting routes
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protectionAppendix 2.
‘Soft’ identification of prior art in
the US
The lack of search report: the novelty standard prohibits the grant of a patent if a
description of the invention has been previously published. According to Barton
(2000), however, prior publications in the US system would not bar issuance unless
all features of the invention have been disclosed in a single prior publication. The fact
that no search report is publicly available (for any domestic application) is evidence
of a lack of transparency on the part of the USPTO with respect to the rest of the world.
A filing at the USPTO automatically leads to a search and examination, whereas at the
EPO and most other patent offices in the world a search is first performed and then a
search report published together with the filed document within 18 months of the
date of application. A substantive examination is performed only at the request of the
applicant (otherwise the patent falls into the public domain). As search reports
provide an early indication of patentability, the USPTO would improve its own backlog
by performing (and publishing) a search report.
A grace periodallows researchers to publish a scientific article but to submit a patent
application on the same content up to one year after the publication date (or the
release of the working paper, or the dissemination of conference proceedings).
Japan has adopted similar legislation but with a shorter grace period. This flexibility
is particularly welcomed by academic researchers, because the patenting process
does not obstruct or delay their publication output. The grace period is particularly
relevant to the first-to-invent rule that applies in the US. In nearly all other countries
a first-to-file rule has long been applicable in order to stimulate researchers to file
patents as soon as practicable, and to avoid the often difficult process of identifying
the ‘first’ inventor in case of litigation. 
Continuation in parts (CIPs) means subsequent applications based on a priority(first) filing, which share the same ‘priority date’ (date of first filing). CIPs may add,
change, or withdraw claims in the original application. It is a facility frequently used
by applicants in order to maintain important claims under examination and to enlarge
the scope of protection. The possibility to add claims in subsequent CIPs provides an
incentive to file further applications. The European counterpart to continuation in
parts is a divisional application, or the splitting of the original patent application into
two or more subsequent applications. It generally occurs with large applications
involving numerous claims and which contain more than one invention. The scope for
abuse of these facilities, especially CIP, is clear.
The pre-grant opposition process allows third parties to challenge the validity of a
patent before the EPO up to nine months after the decision to grant. This process
improves the actual and perceived quality of the European patent system. It is much
less expensive than patent litigation in court (see Chapter 2) and allows third parties
to produce new prior art or useful information against the validity of a patent. About
five percent of granted patents are currently opposed. The US system does not have
such a system, which means that challengers bear the burden of very high litigation
costs (see Hall et al. (2003), Graham and Harhoff (2006) and Maskus (2006) for
qualitative and quantitative arguments in favour of the instalment of a reasonably
priced post-grant opposition process at the USPTO).
Hidden applications introduce further unwelcome uncertainty into the system. In
most countries except the US, patent applications are kept secret (unpublished) for
only 18 months from the priority filing. The patent application is then published. In
the US only patent applications for international markets (under the PCT) are pub-
lished. Domestic applications targeting the US market alone are kept secret during
the whole examination process and are only published once granted. This specificity
undermines the US patent system, as it encourages ‘submarine’ strategies, which
consist in keeping a patent pending (and hence unpublished) until its grant, and
then immediately enforcing it. 
In Europe (nearly) all applications are published 18 months after their priority date.
It is possible to hide an application only if it is refused by an examiner (or withdrawn
by the applicant) before the official publication date.
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The Patent Prosecution Highway
pilot programme between the
USPTO and the EPO
I. Background
The European Patent Office (EPO) and the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) announced on 28 April 2008 that they intended to launch a new trial co-
operation initiative called the Patent Prosecution Highway (PPH) in September
2008. The PPH is designed to leverage fast-track patent examination procedures
already available at both offices and thus to allow applicants to obtain patents more
quickly and efficiently. It also permits each office to exploit the work previously done
by the other office and thus reduce duplication. In turn the initiative will reduce the
examination workload and improve patent quality.
II. Patent Prosecution Highway pilot programme 
The PPH was established to enable an applicant whose claims are determined to be
patentable/allowable in the office of first filing (OFF) to have the corresponding appli-
cation filed in the office of second filing (OSF) for accelerated examination while at
the same time allowing the OSF to exploit the work results of the OFF. 
Where the EPO is the OFF and the EPO application contains claims that are deter-
mined to be patentable/allowable, the applicant may request accelerated examina-
tion at the USPTO for the corresponding application filed with the USPTO as the OSF.
The procedures and requirements for filing a request with the USPTO for participation
in the PPH pilot programme are available from the USPTO website at: www.uspto.gov.
Where the USPTO is the OSF, the applicant must provide the USPTO with the necessary
documents for requesting participation in the PPH pilot programme. It is envisaged toallow applicants to request the EPO to obtain the necessary documents electronical-
ly via Document Access System (DAS). 
Where the EPO is the OSF and the corresponding application filed with the USPTO as
the OFF contains claims that are determined to be patentable/allowable, the appli-
cant may request participation in the PPH pilot programme at the EPO.
The PPH pilot programme started on 29 September 2008, for a period of one year. The
trial period may be extended for one more year if necessary to assess the PPH pro-
gramme’s feasibility. The EPO and the USPTO will evaluate the results of the pilot pro-
gramme to determine if and how the programme should be fully implemented after
the trial period. The offices may also terminate the PPH pilot programme early if the
volume of participation exceeds a manageable level, or for any other reason.
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Foundation Projects for a work
sharing infrastructure 
To secure the necessary infrastructure, the five patent offices will each lead two of a
total of ten Foundation Projects over the coming years. The projects aim to harmonize
the global environment for patent searches and examination and to enable work-
sharing among the five offices. 
The designated offices and their projects are as follows: 
European Patent Office (EPO): Common Documentation Database with resource
material for patent examination and Common Approach for a Hybrid Classification of
patents across offices. 
Korean Intellectual Property Office (KIPO): Common Training Policy for patent exam-
iners and Mutual Machine Translation to overcome language barriers. 
Japan Patent Office (JPO): Common Access to Search and Examination Results
across offices and Common Application Format to ensure that patents are digitally
filed in XML-format. 
State Intellectual Property Office of the People's Republic of China (SIPO): Common
Rules for Examination Practice and Quality Control to harmonise patent quality
standards and Common Statistical Parameter System for Examination for accurate
international patent statistics. 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO): Common Approach to Sharing
and Documenting Search Strategies and Common Search and Examination Support
Tools in a shared system.The project's progress will be closely monitored and discussed at follow-up meetings
throughout the next year. 
Source: EPO (2008) ‘Five IP Offices announce shared vision on cooperative frame-
work’, http://www.epo.org/topics/news/2008/20081031.html, 31 October,
accessed 4 June 2009
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Four case studies on economic
incongruities created by the
European patent system
Four case studies illustrate the economic incongruities created by the currently frag-
mented European patent system and the managerial complexity this implies for
firms. These case studies are reported with more details in Mejer and van
Pottelsberghe (2009).
Epilady v. Remington:In 1988, Remington entered the European market with Smooth
and Silky, a ladies’ shaver that performed exactly the same function as the patented
Epiladyproducts but with a slightly different mechanism. Within the same year it had
filed an opposition at the EPO questioning the validity of Epilady’s patent. The Epilady
patent was eventually upheld by the EPO in 1991. Meanwhile, Epilady brought a
patent infringement action against Remington in Austria, Belgium, Germany, France,
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The subsequent rulings of the
national courts differed across jurisdictions. Courts in Austria, France and the United
Kingdom judged that there was no infringement of the Epilady patent, whereas courts
in Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands ruled that an infringement had taken
place. 
The Epilady case illustrates the ‘non-European’ dimension of the European patent
system: national courts do their own thing.
Coffee wars: The Dutch-American company Sara Lee/DE and Philips Electronics
developed the Senseo coffee machine, for which a patent was granted by the EPO.
The coffee machine proved to be a great success and competitors started enteringthe market for coffee pads, delivering copy-cat products in shops. At the end of 2001
Sara Lee initiated a number of infringement proceedings against several competitors
in Belgium and in the Netherlands. It argued that as the pads constituted an essen-
tial part of the innovation, producing and selling them constituted an indirect
infringement of the patent. Shortly after the grant, in September 2001, the firm Albert
Heijn B.V filed an opposition before the EPO. In mid 2002 the Court of Appeal in The
Hague held in its preliminary proceedings that there was no indirect infringement.
Therefore, the Dutch competitors were allowed to continue selling their copy-cat prod-
ucts. In 2004 the Antwerp Court of Appeal, without waiting for the outcome of the
opposition proceedings at EPO, held that the competitors had infringed the patent.
Sara Lee won in Belgium and kept its monopolistic situation until August 2006, when
the EPO actually revoked the patent in full for lack of an inventive step. 
The Senseo case shows that the current system not only produces discrepancies in
interpreting the claims and evaluating infringements but also generates time para-
doxes or inconsistencies, especially when the EPO and national courts decide in
parallel on the validity of a patent.
The Euro: Document Security System Inc. (DSS) is a US firm which holds a European
patent for ‘non-replicable document and method of making same’. In August 2005
DSS filed a patent infringement suit before the European Union’s Court of First
Instance (CFI) against the European Central Bank (ECB) claiming that it was infring-
ing on their technology (ECJ case T-295/05).  The ECB then filed claims to invalidate
the DSS Patent in eight countries. The United Kingdom and French Patent Court inval-
idated the DSS patent, but the German and Dutch Patent Courts upheld it. The CFI of
the European Union refused jurisdiction in the DDS patent infringement suit, paving
the way for country-by-country infringement litigation related to the ‘single’
currency.  
The Euro case illustrates the discrepancies in assessing the validity of a patent and
the difficulty to identify a proper ‘central’ authority for infringement.
Angiotech v. Conor: Angiotech, is a Vancouver-based pharmaceutical company which
patented an innovative stent coated with paclitaxel-containing polymer that prevents
restenosis, a typical problem following angioplasty.  In 1997 the EPO granted the
Angiotech patent. Conor Medsystems conducted a similar research project and
patented a stent that also contained paclitaxel. Angiotech’s patent was opposed at
the EPO by five different companies, including Conor. In February 2005, Angiotech
initiated patent infringement action in the Netherlands against Conor. Shortly after, a
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was invalid. In February 2006, the court of first instance in the UK held the Angiotech
patent to be invalid due to the lack of inventive step. The District Court in The Hague
held the opposite, validating Angiotech’s patent. Eventually, after nine years of oppo-
sition proceedings, the EPO decided in March 2007 to uphold Angiotech’s patent,
however making very extensive amendments to the claims. 
The Angiotech vs. Conor case shows that the definition of ‘inventive step’ is far from
being obvious and varies across member states, which can lead to different out-
comes for a given product.
Cases of antagonism between EU competition jurisdiction and national jurisdictions
and cases of applicants taking the easier intra-EU parallel trade are nearly as fre-
quent as the number of patents in force in Europe. They affect the managerial
complexity and litigation costs ‘only’ when infringement occurs. ‘Time paradox’ is a
less frequent event because it takes place only when a centralised process (ie an
opposition at the EPO) occurs simultaneously with one or several national cases of
litigation. This type of incongruity is, however, more frequent than it appears at first
sight, and the heterogeneous decisions of national courts exacerbate this effect.
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The PCT route: description and
stylised facts
Table 6 (overleaf)presents the number of time International Search Authorities (ISA)
and International Preliminary Examination Authorities (IPEA) are designated by
patent offices around the world to perform the searches and preliminary examina-
tions of PCT filings. It appears that the EPO is designated as ISA and IPEA by four other
offices. It is the most frequently listed one, followed by the Australian and the
Austrian Patent Offices (designated as an ISA by three other countries). 
The bottom rows of Table 6 show the PCT fees charged for the search report and for the
preliminary examination, which vary substantially across countries. The cheapest
fees are charged by Austria, South Korea and China. Price competition seems to be
taking place here, at least between a few offices. For instance, the cheapest office, in
South Korea, was ‘officially’ selected by Microsoft corporation to proceed its 500+
annual PCT applications (according to Asialaw IP Review, January 2007, p. 19). For
the search report, the EPO, the Swedish patent office and the USPTO are by far the
most expensive offices, especially when compared to the Chinese or South Korean
patent offices. For the preliminary examination, the EPO appears as an outlier, with a
fee that is at least three times higher than in other patent offices. Such a high level of
heterogeneity in PCT fee schedules again raises the quality issue: do these fee varia-
tions reflect variations in the quality of the search and examination services? If so,
this would again militate against any attempt to move towards mutual recognition
practices.Table 6: ISA and IPEA designated by selected patent offices for their PCT applications
International Search Authorities (ISA) and International Preliminary Examination Authorities (IPEA) are
chosen by each PCT member state. Fees are expressed in euro, * are the fees charged if the search report
was performed by the same office, and ** if the search report was performed by another office. The fees
charged by Spain and Finland are very similar to the fees requested by Sweden (SE). The ISA/IPEA
offices that are not listed in the table are the Spanish Patent and Trade Mark Office; the National Board
of Patents and Registration of Finland; the Federal Service for Intellectual Property, Patents and
Trademarks (Russian Federation) and the Nordic Patent Institute. http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/
access/isa_ipea_agreements.html 
(1) The Agreement that allows Australian applicants to choose KIPO as ISA or IPEA was concluded in
September 2008. It is anticipated that this agreement will come into force in early 2009.
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/resources/news_new.shtml#44
(2) EPO acted as ISA and IPEA for Canada until 2004 when the Canada itself obtained ISA/IPEA status
www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/epic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/en/wr00733e.html 
(3) EPO will only act as IPEA where the international search report was issued by the EPO or was done
in one of the following EPC offices: Austria, Finland, Spain, Sweden. Similarly the USPTO declared that it
is competent as IPEA only if the international search report has been prepared by that office.
(4) Korea designated AU-PO only as ISA, not as an IPEA. 
Source: adapted from country-specific information provided in the PCT Guide, World Intellectual Property
Organization www.wipo.int/pct/guide/en/index.html
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Receiving
office
Selected authorities that can act as ISA or IPEA under PCT, as of November 2008
AT-PO AU-PO CIPO SIPO EPO JPO KIPO SE-PO USPTO Total:
AU (1) X X 2
BR X X XX4
CA (2) X 1
CN X 1
EU (3) X 1
IN X X X X XX6
JP X X2
KR (4) X X X X 4
US (3) X X XX 4
T o t a l : 34125 2323
Search  fees  200 827 1023 231 1700 726 128 1607 1351
Examin. fees 200
284*
403**
511 165 1675 270 128 508
450*
563**
Total fees 400 1101 1534 396 3375 996 256 2115 1801Methodology and
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